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ABSTRACT 
This is a qualitative and quantitative study of the semi-submersible network operating out 
of the southwestern portion of Colombia. This study combines both of these aspects to 
provide strategic options for kinetic, non-kinetic, and a combination of both measures for 
commanders to use to disrupt or destroy this network. 
Empirical historical data provide the qualitative information essential to 
understanding the present-day situation. The quantitative data are a combination of geo-
spatial analysis, link analysis, social network analysis, and temporal analysis. Together, 
these paint a picture of the main source of revenue for the FARC. Open-source 
intelligence was used for all of the analysis which, when combined with other forms of 
intelligence, may illuminate the network and portray it in a new light. 
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The FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) is one of the most 
enduring insurgency networks that exist in the history of Latin America. This adaptive 
network continues to evolve despite the significant gains made by the Colombian 
government over the last 10 years. The network consists of more than 8,000 fighters and 
is supported by an even larger network of popular and Bolivarian militias.1 The purpose 
of the FARC is to establish a Marxist-Leninist government in Colombia that would 
address the economic grievances of those excluded by the current political system.2 This 
terrorist group is comprised of high- and mid-level leaders with strong ideological 
foundations who are committed to leading a revolution by force, if necessary, to change 
the political and economic system of Colombia. The FARC has relied on criminal 
activities, and primarily drug trafficking operations, to fund its insurgency.3 Countries, 
such as Venezuela, Argentina, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, support these efforts and 
consider the FARC a legitimate insurgency with genuine political grievances, whereas 
INTERPOL, the United States, Canada, and the European Union consider the FARC a 
terrorist organization.4 Despite the gains made by Colombia’s security forces in 
decreasing the network from 19,000 estimated fighters in 2002 to 8,000 today, the FARC 
continues to remain a persistent and formidable threat.  
 
 
                                                 
1 U.S. State Department, “Background Note: Colombia,” July 13, 2011, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35754.htm. 
2 Cristina C. Lucena, “Who Are the FARC?” Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, n.d., 
http://www.colombiasoyyousa.org/quienes-son-las-farc.html. 
3 U.S. State Department, “Background Note: Colombia.” 
4 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Latin America Terrorism Issues, by Mark 
P. Sullivan, CRS Report RL21049 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, 
February 23, 2011), 2. 
 2 
As a peasant insurgency that began as a small network in 1964, the FARC 
network did not require many financial resources to operate, but as it continued to grow, 
it realized that it needed to increase its financial resources to accomplish its strategic 
objective. Consequently, the FARC made some key financial decisions on how to fund its 
operations. It turned to drug trafficking to fund its expansion. 
The authors’ fundamental assumption in this thesis is that a key component of an 
effective counterinsurgency plan is an attack on an insurgency’s financial network, which 
in this case, is the FARC’s drug network. Drug trafficking operations primarily fund the 
FARC’s political and military activities, which seek to undermine the democratically 
elected government of Colombia. Disruption of the FARC’s financial network would 
severely hamper its capacity to recruit, pay the salaries of its fighters, and fund the 
progression of its ideology abroad. Furthermore, evidence gathered from computer files 
belonging to former FARC Secretariat Raul Reyes suggests that the network has 
attempted to buy political support from Ecuador and Venezuela by funding certain 
presidential candidates during election campaigns and by supporting key government 
leaders.5 Thus, undermining the FARC’s financial resources would reduce its ability to 
promote its ideology abroad through social media, the Internet, and influential leftist 
intellectuals.6  
Greater access to capital also allows the FARC to purchase new weaponry, such 
as Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), which could strategically affect the 
nature of the conflict.7 In 2005, the FARC had the opportunity to buy MANPADS from 
China but could not obtain the financial resources in time, and as a result, was unable to 
purchase them.8 One of the reasons for Colombia’s recent military successes against the 
FARC is its ability to move and mass forces quickly by using helicopters to gain a 
                                                 
5 “The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archive of Raul Reyes,” International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, May 2011, 32. 
6 Mario Escobar (Lieutenant Colonel,Colombian Naval Infantry), in discussion with Major Armando 
Hernandez (U.S. Army), March 8, 2012. 
7 “The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archive of Raul Reyes,” 32. 
8 “The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archive of Raul Reyes,” 32. 
 3 
tactical advantage.9 Attaining MANPADS would have significantly improved the 
FARC’s military capacity and perhaps negated the Colombian Military’s (COLMIL) 
mobility advantage. Although it was previously unsuccessful in the acquisition of 
MANPADS, with the right amount of financial resources, the FARC is likely to try again. 
Successfully attacking the FARC financial network could possibly disrupt its entire 
network and increase prospects for peace. 
To understand the FARC’s resilience and capacity to profit from the drug trade, 
the locus of its semi-submersible operations is first identified. Figure 1 illustrates 
(highlighted in red) the location of the semi-submersible network along the Pacific coast.  
                                                 
9 Robert Haddick, “Colombia Can Teach Afghanistan (and the United States) How to Win,” Air and 




 Pacific region of Colombia affected by the semi-submersibles10 Figure 1. 
This thesis takes a deeper dive into the Colombia’s Pacific coast where the FARC 
helped create a network of FARC units, criminal gangs, and the National Liberation 
Army (a small leftist guerilla group with ties to Cuba) (ELN) designed to profit from the 
trafficking of cocaine. The key feature of this network is its use of semi-submersibles for 
coca export. Semi-submersibles are crafts capable of moving in water with or without 
self-propulsion, including platforms, whose properties allow partial or total immersion.11 
Figure 2 illustrates the semi-submersible network in the Pacific. Each dot on the map 
represents the location of FARC and criminal organizations that comprise the semi-
                                                 
10 This map was created in ARCGIS, the highlighted red area is the focus of this thesis.  
11 Congress of Colombia, “Law 1311 of 2009,” Official Journal No. 47.405, July 9, 2009, 
http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/senado/basedoc/ley/2009/ley_1311_2009.html.  
 5 
submersible network composed of the following major organizations: the Joint Western 
Command (FARC), the Jose Mari Cordoba Block (FARC), the Rastrojos Criminal Gang, 
the Renacer Criminal Gang, the Machos Criminal Gang, the Urabeños Criminal Gang, 
and the ELN. Table 1 summarizes the sub-organizations that comprise the network, 
which are the organizations within the network closely involved with drug trafficking and 
semi-submersible operations. Analyzing how to disrupt this drug trafficking network 
would illustrate how other sub-organizations could be disrupted as well since they have 
similar designs and structure.12  
                                                 
12“International Global Terrorism: Its Links with Illicit Drugs Illustrated by the IRA and Other Groups 




 Map illustrates the location of FARC and Criminal organizations that Figure 2. 
comprise the semi-submersible network in the Pacific13 
                                                 
13 These data were comprised through the use of ORA and exporting the data into ARCGIS. The data 
show the overall connection of the entire network, in essence, this is a sociogram layered on top of a map, 




Joint West Command FARC 
6th Front, 8th Front, 29th Front, 30th Front, 60th Front, Mobile 
Block Carlos Arturo Ruiz (Mobile Column Libardo Garcia, 
Mobile Column Miller Perdomo, Mobile Column Alirio Torres, 
Mobile Column Gabriel Galvis), Mobile Column Daniel Aldana, 
Urban Front Manuel Cepeda Vargas, Mobile Column Jacobo 
Arenas, Mobile Column Mariscal Sucre, Mobile Company Victor 
Saavedra, Political Company Ambrosio Gonzalez. 
Jose Maria Cordoba Block FARC 57th Front. 
Rastrojos Criminal Gang 
Rastrojos Choco14 (Rastrojos Alto Baudo, Rastrojos Bojaya, 
Rastrojos Canton de San Pablo, Rastrojos Condoto, Rastrojos 
Istmina, Rastrojos Litoral de San Juan, Rastrojos Novita, 
Rastrojos Nuqui, Rastrojos Quibdo, Rastrojos San Jose del 
Palmar, Rastrojos Sipi, Rastrojos Tado15) 
Rastrojos Valle del Cauca (Rastrojos Bolivar, Rastrojos 
Buenaventura, Rastrojos Cali, Rastrojos Darien, Rastrojos 
Jamundi16) 
Rastrojos Cauca (Rastrojos Buenos Aires, Rastrojos Cajibio, 
Rastrojos El Tambo, Rastrojos Jambalo, Rastrojos Lopez de 
Micay, Rastrojos Morales, Rastrojos Santander de Quilichao, 
Rastrojos Suarez, Rastrojos Timbiqui, Rastrojos Villa Rica17) 
Rastrojos Nariño. (Rastrojos Barbacoas, Rastrojos El Charco, 
Rastrojos Francisco Pizarro, Rastrojos La Tola, Rastrojos Magui, 
Rastrojos Mosquera, Rastrojos Olaya Herrera, Rastrojos Roberto 
Payan, Rastrojos Santa Barbara, Rastrojos Tumaco18) 
Renacer Criminal Gang Renacer Choco (Renacer Bajo Baudo, Renacer Istmina, Renacer Litoral del San Juan, Renacer Tado.) 
Machos Criminal Gang Machos Valle del Cauca (Machos Bolivar, Machos Bolivar El Dovio, Machos Union, Machos Versalles, Machos Zarzal. 
Urabeños Criminal Gang 
Urabeños Choco (Urabeños Alto Baudo, Urabeños Bajo Baudo, 
Urabeños El Carmen, Urabeños Istmina, Urabeños Lloro, 
Urabeños Medio Atrato, Urabeños Medio Baudo, Urabeños 
Nuqui, Urabeños Quibdo, Urabeños Rio Sucio) 
National Liberation Army–ELN. 
(communist insurgency) 
Company Guerreros del Sindagua, Company Heroes of Andes, 
Company Martyrs of Barbacoas, Company Jose Luis Cabrales, 
Company Special Troops. 
Table 1.   Depicts the overall semi-submersible network operating in the Pacific 
region as seen in Figure 2. 
                                                 
14 Choco, Valle del Cauca, Cauca, and Nariño are departments (states). 
15 Choco municipalities (counties): Alto Baudo, Bajo Baudo, Bojaya, Canton de San Pablo, Condoto, 
El Carmen, Istmina, Litoral de San Juan, Lloro, Medio Atrato, Medio Baudo, Novita, Nuqui, Quibdo, Rio 
Sucio, San Jose del Palmar, Sipi, Tado. 
16 Valle del Cauca municipalities (counties): Bolivar, Buenaventura, Cali, Darien, El Dovio, Jamundi, 
Union, Versalles, and Zarzal. 
17 Cauca municipalities (counties): Buenos Aires, Cajibio, El Tambo, Jambalo, Lopez de Micay, 
Morales, Santander de Quilichao, Suarez, Timbiqui, and Villa Rica. 
18 Nariño municipalities (counties): Barbacoas, El Charco, Francisco Pizarro, La Tola, Magui, 
Mosquera, Olaya Herrera, Roberto Payan, Santa Barbara, and Tumaco. 
 8 
Colombia’s southwest Pacific region is also significant due to its financial 
importance for the drug trafficking operations. This area alone generates more than 65% 
of the FARC’s financial resources. Although the FARC has historically used other 
criminal networks, such as the Rastrojos, to transport its cocaine, two recent semi-
submersible seizures suggest that the FARC is beginning to build its own semi-
submersibles or underwater vehicles.19 While semi-submersibles do not represent the 
most common vehicle for transporting cocaine out of Colombia into Central and North 
America, their technology could be exploited and used by the FARC to transport 
weapons, ammunitions, and other illicit goods. With its large payload capacity and ability 
to remain increasingly undetected in the water, the semi-submersible is the ideal vehicle 
to carry illicit goods over large distances.20 
Data on recent semi-submersible seizures suggests that most of these underwater 
vehicles are being built in the Southwest Pacific region. The South Pacific area shown is 
formed by the departments (states) of Valle del Cauca, Cauca, and Nariño. The area is 
crossed by numerous rivers (Figure 3) flowing from the eastern range (right side of the 
map) to the sea with few roads serving as lines of communication. Many small towns 
have formed along the rivers. The semi-submersibles have been found along the coastal 
regions concealed amongst the mangroves. The map also displays the seizure locations of 
the semi-submersibles discovered through open source research, as well as military bases, 
river towns, and the very small road network. This map shows numerous semi-
submersibles captured along this coastline.  
 
                                                 
19 “Hallan Sumergible de las FARC con sistemas por satélite e informáticos,” Semana, September 26, 
2011, http://www.semana.com/nacion/hallan-sumergible-farc-sistemas-satelite-informaticos/164832-
3.aspx. 
20 Rear Admiral Charles Michel, “Hearing on Border Security Threats to the Homeland: DHS’s 
Response to Innovate Tactics and Techniques,” June 19, 2012. 
 9 
 
 Semi-submersible seizures along the Pacific coast21 Figure 3. 
The implications of these semi-submersibles range far beyond Colombia’s 
borders. As U.S. Vice President Joe Biden told Congress in July 2009, they are more than 
a financial threat; they pose a security threat to the United States.22 Vice Admiral Joseph 
Nimmich, Joint Interagency Task Force Commander, concurred noting that if “[one] can 
carry 10 tons of cocaine, [it] can carry 10 tons of anything.”23 Thus, besides the benefits 
of disrupting the FARC’s semisubmersible network and its financial returns, an 
                                                 
21 This map was created for this thesis using open source data exclusively in ARCGIS.  
22 David Kushner, “Drug Sub-Culture,” The New York Times, April 23, 2009.  
23 Kushner, “Drug Sub-Culture.”  
 10 
additional payoff exists in preventing submersibles and their cargo—either material or 
personnel—from entering the United States and threatening its security.  
Additionally, recent evidence suggests that semi-submersible technology can be 
exploited by terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah, which could conduct attacks on 
behalf of Iran inside the United States. According to former U.S. Ambassador to the 
Organization of American States, Roger F. Noriega, the danger to U.S. homeland security 
is increasing due to the growing presence of Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy Army, in Latin 
America and Mexico.24 In April 2009, Jamal Yousef, who was a former member of the 
Syrian military and Hezbollah agent, was arrested in New York for a weapons smuggling 
operation. Military weapons stolen from U.S. deployed forces in Iraq were sent to 
Mexico, where they were sold to the FARC in exchange for “drugs that were brought to 
the U.S. via Mexican drug cartels.”25 In addition to Yousef’s arrest in 2009, Hezbollah 
leader Jameel Nasr was arrested in July 2010 at the border city of Tijuana, Mexico, for 
establishing a terrorist network in South America. Nasr’s objective was to build a terrorist 
network consisting of Mexican nationals with ties to Lebanon to attack Israeli and 
Western targets.26 These two high-profile arrests illustrate Iran’s efforts to increase its 
terrorist network in the Western Hemisphere. More disconcerting, however, is that 
Hezbollah has links with the FARC network, and could use semi-submersible technology 
to conduct terrorist attacks in the United States. The link between FARC and other 
criminal and terrorist networks thus opens up the potential for the exploitation of semi-
submersible technology to smuggle a weapon of mass destruction inside the United 
States.  
B. THESIS PURPOSE  
The purpose of this thesis is to identify strategic options for disrupting the FARC 
drug trafficking network in the South Pacific region of Colombia. The Pacific is a central 
                                                 
24 Roger F. Noriega, “Hezbollah in Latin America: Implications for U.S. Homeland Security,” U.S. 
House of Representatives Written Hearing, July 7, 2011, 
http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20Noriega.pdf. 
25 Noriega, “Hezbollah in Latin America: Implications for U.S. Homeland Security.” 
26 Noriega, “Hezbollah in Latin America: Implications for U.S. Homeland Security.” 
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location for the design and construction of semi-submersibles. Disruptions of this semi-
submersible network would be a major blow to the FARC’s logistics network, and 
undercut its ability to transport and sell cocaine, and ultimately, finance its insurgency 
against Colombia.  
C. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
Chapter I—This chapter describes the FARC Criminal Network in the Pacific. 
Chapter II—This chapter provides a brief history of the FARC since 1964 and its 
growth over time, and more specifically, on the criminal network in the Pacific. It also 
details the evolution of the semi-submersible network, which recent evidence suggests is 
enabling the FARC to expand its drug logistics and transportation network.  
Chapter III—This chapter describes the thesis methodology. It opens with an 
overview of how the data was collected and why only open source data was chosen for 
this study. Next, it introduces the software package (Palantir) that enabled the structuring 
and preparing of the data used in this thesis’s analysis. Further, it outlines the primary 
methods used in this study—social network analysis (SNA) and use of ORA, UCINET, 
and NETDRAW software packages to conduct the analysis. It also explains the 
advantages of using SNA to tease out strategic options to disrupt the FARC drug 
network. The analysis is conducted at the organizational level of analysis—the network 
data consist of ties between organizations (both FARC and criminal) involved in the 
semi-submersible logistics network in the Pacific. 
Chapter IV—This chapter analyzes the semi-submersible network by using visual 
analytics and social network analysis methodologies.  
Chapter V—This chapter identifies strategic options to disrupt the FARC drug 
network in the Pacific area and provides a comparison and recommendation for which 
strategy to implement.  
Chapter VI—This chapter summarizes and concludes thesis. It also offers insight 
gained from using visual analytics and SNA as a method to develop strategic options for 
disrupting terrorist networks. 
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This chapter provides an overview of the FARC’s network structure and its 
history. Since the objective is to develop recommended strategies for targeting the semi-
submersible network in the Pacific region, it also describes the evolution of semi-
submersibles and how the FARC is using them to transport cocaine. To understand the 
FARC’s use of semi-submersibles, it is necessary to understand the onset of the 
insurgency and the reason it infiltrated every aspect of the drug trade. 
B. THE FARC ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE: CENTRALIZED AT THE 
STRATEGIC LEVEL, DECENTRALIZED AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL 
The FARC is a large, complex network with ties ranging from the drug cartels in 
Mexico and criminal organizations within Colombia, to terrorist organizations in Spain 
(see Figure 4). Its ideological sphere of influence is extensive throughout Latin America, 
and its political objectives are supported by Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Bolivia.27 
Despite being labeled a terrorist organization, the FARC is still recognized as a legitimate 
insurgency by numerous countries in the region.  
                                                 
27 Paul E. Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army (FARC-EP): 




 In addition to its well-documented ties with criminal networks, such as Los Figure 4. 
Rastrojos, Los Zetas, and the Sinaloa Cartel, open source reporting suggests 
that the FARC has ties with other terrorist networks to include Al Qaeda, 
Hezbollah, ETA and Sendero Luminoso (Link diagram was produced by 
Rick Galeano and Mario Escobar with Palantir software using open source 
data).28 
The FARC has long been characterized by a hierarchical structure and is led by 
two decision-making bodies: the Secretariat and the Central Staff.29 The Secretariat, 
which is composed of seven full members and two deputies, oversees the Central Staff. 
The Central Staff is responsible for adjusting strategic plans and appointing members of 
the Secretariat, as well as commanders for the staffs of the Blocs and Fronts, all of which 
are the military components of the FARC.30 The Blocs are composed of the Eastern, the 
                                                 
28 Hugh Bronstein, “Colombia Rebels, al Qaeda in ‘Unholy’ Drug Alliance,” January 4, 2010, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/04/us-drugs-colombia-qaeda-interview-
idUKTRE6034L920100104. 
29 International Crisis Group, “Ending Colombia’s FARC Conflict: Dealing the Right Card,” Latin 
America Report N° 30, 3, March 26, 2009, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-america-
caribbean/andes/colombia/030-ending-colombias-farc-conflict-dealing-the-right-card.aspx. 
30 International Crisis Group, “Ending Colombia’s FARC Conflict: Dealing the Right Card,” 3. 
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Joint Western Command, Southern, Central, Middle Magdalena, Caribbean, and Jose 
Maria Cordoba.31 Each of these Blocs/Commands contains a number of Fronts, Mobile 
Companies or Mobile Columns that average “300 to 600 combatants per unit.”32 The 
focus of this study is on the Joint Western Command as highlighted in Figure 5. 
 
 Hierarchical layout of the FARC structure. All of the blocs and commands Figure 5. 
have the same structure33 
This configuration is very similar to the way military organizations are organized 
with regard to divisions, brigades, battalions, and companies. The FARC’s organizational 
structure has proven to be resilient as it is designed to function even after senior leaders 
are killed or infiltrated by Colombian security forces. As demonstrated by the November 
4, 2011 killing of Alfonso Cano, the Commander in Chief and ideological leader of the 
FARC, the terrorist group continued to function by immediately naming Rodrigo 
Londoño, also known as Timochenko, as its new leader.34 Although the killing of Cano 
by the Colombian military represented a significant setback for the FARC, the 
                                                 
31 Semana.com, “Cual es la situatcion presente de la Farc?” n.d., 
http://www.semana.com/wf_multimedia.aspx?idmlt=601. 
32 Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC-EP): Marxist-
Leninist Insurgency or Criminal Enterprise.” 
33 Semana.com, “Cual es la situatcion presente de la Farc?”  
34 Adriaan Alselma, “Colombian Army Kills FARC Leader Alfonso Cano,” Colombia Reports, 
November 4, 2011, http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/20226-colombian-army-kills-farc-
leader-alfonso-cano-reports.html. 
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organization has not lost its capacity to operate.35 The next section of this chapter 
provides the history of the FARC and overview of how it became involved in the drug 
trade.  
C. “LA VIOLENCIA” AND GUERRILLAS 
The FARC began as a small guerilla group interested in advancing the rights of 
landless peasants in a remote region of Tolima, where very little government 
infrastructure, presence, or control, existed.36 To understand the inception of the FARC, 
it is necessary to understand Colombia’s history and the formation of various guerilla 
networks in the late 1940s as a result of La Violencia (1949–1958). This tumultuous time 
period was an outbreak of violence between the liberals and conservatives, which 
resulted in the deaths of over 200,000 Colombians.37 The original guerrilla networks that 
formed as a result of La Violencia period, however, did not have an ideological purpose 
but rather aimed to address the grievances of disaffected populations (see Figure 6) for 
the formation of guerrillas from 1949–1964. Most were located in the Tolima, Caqueta, 
and Meta departments. The same can be said about the original FARC network since it 
was not ideologically driven when it first solidified in the early 1960s. The FARC, 
however, became more ideologically driven when Colombia’s Communist Party adopted 
the network in 1966 as its armed component (see Figure 7 for a temporal representation 
of the FARC’s history).38 
 
                                                 
35 Simon Romero, “Colombian Rebels Still Dangerous Despite Leader’s Death,” New York Times, 
November 5, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/06/world/americas/alfonso-cano-dead-but-farc-
dangerous-analysts-say.html. 
36 Jane’s Information Group, “Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia (FARC),” n.d., 
https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=Reference&ItemId
=+++1320752&Pubabbrev=JWIT. 
37 Jane’s Information Group, “Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia (FARC).” 
38 “The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archive of Raul Reyes,” 24. 
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 FARC beginning structure from 1949–196439 Figure 6. 
 
 Graphical representation of the FARC’s history40  Figure 7. 
                                                 
39 This network represents a mesh of guerrillas with no leader in different areas of Colombia. From 
1949–1964, various left wing guerrilla groups formed in the Tolima, Meta and Caqueta departments as a 
result of La Violencia. (Network created by LTC Mario Escobar). 
40 Graph created by Rick Galeano using open sources. 
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D. THE BEGINNING OF THE FARC 
A guerrilla group called the Marquetalia Self-Defense Movement and led by 
Pedro Antonio Marin, also known as “Tirofijo,” operated deliberately to address 
grievances of landless peasants.41 Tirofijo declared Marquetalia, Tolima, an independent 
republic in 1960. In an effort to destroy leftist guerrillas who were declaring independent 
republics within the country, the Colombian military conducted the “Marquetalia 
Operation,” which defeated Tirofijo’s small network and recovered territory claimed by 
the guerrillas.42 Despite the tactical defeat, Tirofijo and his leaders managed to escape 
government capture. Soon thereafter, Tirofijo and other guerrilla leaders held the first 
organized FARC conference at the end of 1964 and agreed to consolidate into a single 
network called the “Southern Bloc.”43 On May 5, 1966, the Southern Bloc, which was 
comprised of 350 men, held its 2nd Conference44 at which the network named itself the 
FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) while designating Tirofijo the 
prevailing leader of the network (see Figure 7).45  
According to the FARC, the military’s attack on Marquetalia compelled them to 
execute an armed struggle against the Colombian government. At this point, the network 
developed its purpose with greater clarity since its mission aimed to end the political, 
economic inequality of Colombia, while preventing continued U.S. intervention by 
establishing a Marxist-Leninist, Bolivarian state.46 During the third conference, the 
network realized its need to expand to achieve its political goal of establishing a new 
Colombia that would change the economic system to address the grievances of the 
disaffected.47 As result, the Central Staff created new fronts and established programs to  
 
                                                 
41 Richard Gott, Guerrilla Movements in Latin America (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 2008), 234. 
42 Jane’s Information Group, “Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia (FARC).” 
43 Jane’s Information Group, “Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia (FARC).” 
44 Jane’s Information Group, “Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia (FARC).” 
45 Jane’s Information Group, “Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia (FARC).” 
46 Jane’s Information Group, “Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia (FARC).” 
47 Jane’s Information Group, “Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia (FARC).” 
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indoctrinate the masses on the ideals of the organization to gain the required popular 
support. In 1966, the Colombian Communist Party adopted the FARC as its armed 
component of the organization.48 
E. THE FARC CONFERENCES 
The FARC held its 4th, 5th, and 6th conferences in 1971, 1974, and 1978, 
respectively, with the purpose of expanding the network and outlining its strategic goals. 
It realized that it needed to increase in size to achieve its strategic goal of assuming 
power of Colombia. By the 5th Conference, the size of the Central Staff increased to 13 
members, with the FARC network consisting of 600 men and 5 Fronts.49 During the 6th 
Conference, the FARC decided to double the size of each Front to establish an armed 
presence in each department of Colombia.50 By the end of 1978, the FARC network 
consisted of 1,200 fighters and 14 fronts (See Figure 8).51 
 
                                                 
48 “The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archive of Raul Reyes,” 24. 
49 Carlos A. Padilla, “The FARC and Hugo Chavez: Is Contemporary Venezuela a Threat to 
Colombia?” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 14. 
50 Padilla, “The FARC and Hugo Chavez: Is Contemporary Venezuela a Threat to Colombia?” 16.  
51 Padilla, “The FARC and Hugo Chavez: Is Contemporary Venezuela a Threat to Colombia?” 16.  
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 FARC structure from FARC structure from 1966–197852 Figure 8. 
Since the network more than doubled its size in a period of less than four years, 
the FARC required more substantial financial resources to sustain its operations. Given 
that it operated without the help of external support from other left-wing governments 
(for example, Cuba preferred the ELN over the FARC), the FARC relied on extortions of 
wealthy companies within Colombia and kidnappings to fund its activities.53  
The 7th Conference of 1982 is considered one of the most important. The FARC 
intended for a strategy that would address the existing social struggles of the nation. Its 
aim was to tie the armed revolutionary activities of the countryside to the insurrectional 
activities of the major cities, which would, in turn, lead to its desired end state of taking 
power of Colombia by force.54 The 7th Conference was also where the FARC made the 
key decision that would expand its financial resources through the drug trade.55 The 
FARC realized that it needed greater military capacity to fund large-scale military 
                                                 
52 In the second conference of 1966, the Southern Bloc names itself the FARC and designates Tirofijo 
as its leader. By the end of 1974, the size of the Central Staff consisted of 13 members, and the network 
increased in size to five fronts, 600 men. The FARC continued to evolve and more than doubled in size by 
1978 to 1,200 fighters.  
53 Padilla, “The FARC and Hugo Chavez: Is Contemporary Venezuela a Threat to Colombia?” 16. 
54 Padilla, “The FARC and Hugo Chavez: Is Contemporary Venezuela a Threat to Colombia?” 16. 
55 Padilla, “The FARC and Hugo Chavez: Is Contemporary Venezuela a Threat to Colombia?” 16. 
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operations against the Colombian government.56 As a result from its key decision to 
profit from the drug trade, the FARC began to tax transactions between the buyers and 
the coca growers while providing protection to airfields and drug labs.57 By the end of 
1993, the FARC expanded the network of 8,000 fighters and become involved in all 
aspects of the drug trade, which allowed it to increase its financial resources significantly 
(See Figure 9).58  
 
 By the end of 1993, the FARC expanded to a network of 8,000 fighters  Figure 9. 
F. NEW STRATEGIC PLAN: BOLIVARIAN CAMPAIGN FOR A NEW 
COLOMBIA 
Another pivotal event in the history of the FARC was a May 10, 1989 meeting in 
La Meta, at which key FARC leaders established a strategic plan called the “Bolivarian 
                                                 
56 International Crisis Group, “Ending Colombia’s FARC Conflict: Dealing the Right Card,” 3. 
57 David L. DeAtley, “Illicit Drug Funding: The Surprising Systemic Similarities Between the FARC 
and the Taliban,” (master’s thesis, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command 
and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, AY2010), 17, 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a525726.pdf. 
58 Padilla, “The FARC and Hugo Chavez: Is Contemporary Venezuela a Threat to Colombia?” 17. 
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Campaign for a New Colombia.”59 The FARC’s new offensive strategic plan stipulated 
taking power of Colombia within eight years.60 To achieve this objective, the FARC 
planned to increase the size of its network to 80 fronts and 32,000 fighters, which would 
require $200 million to support its sustainment.61 The plan required launching major, 
coordinated offensives against important city targets that included Bogotá, in which 
16,000 fighters would wage irregular warfare, whereas the other 16,000 would be used to 
overrun military bases and major population centers.62 If the offensive failed, the FARC 
would fall back to predetermined positions to plan a second offensive, while assigned 
units would be responsible for inciting mass-based insurrections.63  
In addition to the key meeting of 1989, Bolivarian and regular militias were 
created the same year to assist the network, mobilize political support, and achieve its 
objective of assuming power of Colombia.64 Bolivarian militias, which were more 
politically indoctrinated than regular militias, participated in combat during portions of 
the year whereas regular militiamen did not.65 By 1996, the FARC demonstrated that it 
had entered the mobile warfare stage, and it had reached a military strength of over 
11,000 fighters.66 From 1996–1998, with more significant sources of revenue as a result 
of the drug trade, the FARC achieved numerous military successes and was capable of 
                                                 
59 Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC-EP): Marxist-
Leninist Insurgency or Criminal Enterprise?” 41. 
60 Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC-EP): Marxist-
Leninist Insurgency or Criminal Enterprise?” 29. 
61 Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC-EP): Marxist-
Leninist Insurgency or Criminal Enterprise?” 29. 
62 Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC-EP): Marxist-
Leninist Insurgency or Criminal Enterprise?” 21. 
63 Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC-EP): Marxist-
Leninist Insurgency or Criminal Enterprise?” 20. 
64 Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC-EP): Marxist-
Leninist Insurgency or Criminal Enterprise?” 20. 
65 Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC-EP): Marxist-
Leninist Insurgency or Criminal Enterprise?” 20. 
66 Jane’s Information Group, “Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia (FARC).” 
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launching large-scale offensive operations. In one attack in 1998, the FARC’s Eastern 
Bloc seized the state capital city of Mitu in Vaupes with a force of 1,500 fighters.67  
FARC military victories from 1996 to 1998 convinced 65% of the population that 
it would eventually assume power of Colombia; the Colombian military was 
demoralized.68 The following FARC victories in the late 1990s illustrate how effective it 
had become at combating the Colombian military. 
• August 1996: The six Southern Bloc fronts attacked an army base in 
Putumayo. The military base surrendered, and the combat engagement 
resulted in 54 soldiers killed, 17 wounded, and 60 kidnapped.69 
• December 1997: 300 guerrillas from the Southern Bloc killed 22 soldiers 
in Nariño.70 
• March 1998: 400 guerrillas from Southern Bloc annihilated the elite 3rd 
Mobile Brigade in Southern Caquetá, which resulted in 65 soldiers killed 
and 43 kidnapped.71 
• August 1998: 500 guerrillas from Eastern Bloc killed 30 soldiers and 
kidnapped 100 in Guaviare.72 
• November 1998: 1,500 guerrillas from Eastern Bloc seized Mitu, capital 
city of the state of Vaupes and 37 soldiers were killed, and 61 
kidnapped.73 
G. THE ERA OF THE “DESPEJE” (1998–2002) 
The FARC military victories from 1996 to 1998 increased the pressure on the 
Colombian government to negotiate for peace. With the FARC negotiating from a 
position of strength, it demanded access to a demilitarized zone in exchange for peace 
                                                 
67 Padilla, “The FARC and Hugo Chavez: Is Contemporary Venezuela a Threat to Colombia?” 21.  
68 Max Boot, “The Colombian Miracle,” The Weekly Standard, December 14, 2009, 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/017/301nyrut.asp. 
69 Angela Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth, The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and 
Its Implications for Regional Stability (RAND Corporation, 2001), 42. 
70 Rabasa and Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth, The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its 
Implications for Regional Stability, 42. 
71 Rabasa and Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth, The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its 
Implications for Regional Stability, 42. 
72 Rabasa and Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth, The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its 
Implications for Regional Stability, 42. 
73 Rabasa and Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth, The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its 
Implications for Regional Stability, 42. 
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talks.74 Colombian President Andres Pastrana acquiesced and granted the FARC network 
the “Depeje,” a safe haven within Colombia as large as the country of Switzerland.75 
With this large area under its control, the FARC was able to increase its military capacity 
and turn its territory into a “drug depot.”76 By the end of 2002, the FARC expanded to a 
force of 17,000 fighters, which is the largest it has ever been (see Figure 10).77  
 
 FARC structure from 1994–200878 Figure 10. 
The FARC network was able to eliminate the middle-brokers of the drug trade, 
and thus, undertook a more direct role in the production and distribution of cocaine by 
forcing farmers to grow coca and then sell it to FARC commanders for processing.79 
                                                 
74 Padilla, “The FARC and Hugo Chavez: Is Contemporary Venezuela a Threat to Colombia?” 17. 
75 Padilla, “The FARC and Hugo Chavez: Is Contemporary Venezuela a Threat to Colombia?” 17. 
76 International Crisis Group, “War and Drugs in Colombia,” Latin America Report N° 11, 22, January 
27, 2005, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/011-war-and-
drugs-in-colombia.aspx. 
77 Jane’s Information Group, “Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia (FARC).” 
78 The FARC grew to 66 Fronts and 17,000 fighters by 2002.  
79 International Crisis Group, “War and Drugs in Colombia,” 22. 
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Greater FARC activity in the drug trade in the late 1990s also corresponded with the 
decline of the Medellín and Cali cartels. As the Colombian government was dismantling 
these large drug trafficking cartels, the FARC was filling this void and expanding their 
role in criminal operations.80 By 2005, it was estimated that 65 of the FARC’s 110 
operating units were involved in the cultivation and distribution of cocaine.81  
In February 2002, Pastrana terminated the peace process since the FARC 
demonstrated that it was not interested in pursuing a peaceful end to the conflict but 
rather in increasing its military capacity to take power by force.82 The “Despeje” enabled 
the FARC to expand its military capacity and prepare a final offensive against Bogotá 
and other cities.83 Pastrana’s decision to terminate the peace talks also coincided with the 
U.S. decision to label the FARC a terrorist network following the attacks of 9/11. The 
European Union followed the U.S. decision, and on June 17, 2002, the FARC was added 
to its list of foreign terrorist organizations.  
H. COLOMBIA’S GOVERNMENT TURNS THE TIDE AGAINST THE 
FARC  
When President Alvaro Uribe Velez was elected as the new President of 
Colombia, he unveiled a new security initiative called the Democratic Security and 
Defense Policy (DSP) in June 2003.84 His new policy directive was aimed at defeating 
the FARC network by restoring government control in all areas of Colombia while 
strengthening the military and the National Police.85 Colombia increased defense 
spending to 4.5% of its gross domestic product (GDP) while imposing a war tax to fund 
the war effort.86 The modernization of the Colombian military in combination with U.S. 
military aid created stronger, more capable security institutions, which, in turn, caused an 
                                                 
80 International Crisis Group, “War and Drugs in Colombia,” 22. 
81 International Crisis Group, “War and Drugs in Colombia,” 22.  
82 Pastrana ends peace process in 2002. 
83 Despeje allows FARC to increase military capacity and threaten the cities.  
84 Jane’s Information Group, “Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia (FARC).” 
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immediate impact against the FARC and turned the tide in favor of Colombia’s 
government. By the end of his second term in office, President Uribe’s successful 
counterinsurgency plan effectively reduced the size of the FARC network from 18,000 to 
8,000 fighters, while killing and capturing many of its key leaders that included Raul 
Reyes.87 Consequently, Colombia’s security gains against the FARC boosted economic 
growth and an increase of confidence in the government’s ability to defeat the FARC 
network. By the end of 2010, the FARC had less than 2% support of the population 
whereas President Uribe enjoyed overwhelming support.88  
Immediately after assuming Colombia’s Presidency, President Juan Manuel 
Santos continued Uribe’s aggressive counterinsurgency strategy, which resulted in the 
killing of Mono Jojoy in September 2010, and Alfonso Cano in November 2011.89 In 
addition to continuing an aggressive counterinsurgency against the FARC, Santos 
restored diplomatic relations with Venezuela and hosted the summit of the Americas in 
April 2012.90 Under his leadership, Colombia has also signed a free trade agreement with 
the European Union.91 He has also begun exploratory peace talks with the FARC 
network.92 Due to the recent successes against the FARC, Colombia’s government is in a 
strong position to negotiate a peace settlement that would result in a peace agreement 
favorable to the Santos administration. However, despite the counter-drug and 
counterterrorism gains by the Colombian National Police and military, the FARC 
continues to profit from drug trafficking operations through alliances with other criminal 
organizations and has assumed responsibility over key components of the drug trafficking 
trade. With a force of 8,000 fighters and estimated yearly revenues of $100 million to $1 
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billion a year from the drug trade, the FARC continues to remain a formidable foe (See 
Figure 11 for a temporal representation of drug trafficking operations).93  
 
 FARC drug trafficking operations from 1969–2011  Figure 11. 
I. HISTORY OF SEMI-SUBMERSIBLES 
The semi-submersible represents the evolution of how cocaine is transported out 
of Colombia. Although cocaine is predominantly transported out of western Colombia 
with fast boats, the first seizure of a semi-submersible in 1993 represented a change in the 
way cocaine is being transported (see Figure 12). Drug traffickers became interested in 
this new transportation technology because these underwater vehicles are difficult to 
detect and can carry a large payload with very little logistical support. In 1995, a Russian 
citizen was arrested in Miami for trying to sell an old soviet submarine to Colombian 
                                                 
93 Michael Freeman, Lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, May 15, 2012.  
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cartels. Later in 2000, Colombian police found a half-built semi-submersible in Bogotá, 
which also included Russian documents for designing the underwater vehicle. This 
partially constructed semi-submersible was 100 feet long and capable of carrying more 
than 200 tons of cocaine. Although they cost less than $1 million to make, a single trip 
can generate more than $100 million in profits for drug traffickers.  
 
 Evolution of the semi-submersible Figure 12. 
According to Rear Admiral Joe Nimmich, Director of JIATF-South, more semi-
submersibles were built after 2006 because Pakistani and Sri Lankan submarine experts 
provided Colombian criminals the expertise. With this new knowledge, Colombian 
cartels have been able to build semi-submersibles quickly, stealthily, cheaply, and with 
readily available materials deep in the jungle. To avoid detection, workers will spend 15 
to 20 days under the protection of thick canopy jungle to build these vehicles by hand 
from start to finish. A recent seizure in 2011 in the remote region of Timbiqui, Colombia, 
illustrates that these cocaine transporters are being built so that they can travel fully 
submerged underwater, just like a submarine. This particular vehicle was built by the 
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FARC’s Joint Western Command, which represents a new capability for this terror 
network. The captured fully submerged vehicle (FSV) had sophisticated Global 
Positioning System (GPS) navigation and was built primarily with fiberglass 
construction. The shape of the submarine and the materials used to build them, also 
allows them to have a low radar signature, which further complicates their detection. 
Furthermore, since they are usually painted black, trying to identify them by air makes it 
virtually impossible. With the newer semi-submersibles using lead pipes in their 
construction, they have become more difficult to detect using infrared since they are 
producing a low heat signature (Table 2 represents a semi-submersible classification 
chart).94 Finding these semi-submersibles in the water is difficult since none was 
interdicted in 2011. Due to their increasing sophistication and capacity to remain 
undetected at sea, a greater possibility exists of finding the semi-submersibles on land 
before they deploy on their mission.  
 
Table 2.   Semi-submersible classification chart (JIATF-SOUTH) 
J. THE FARC’S JOINT WESTERN COMMAND NETWORK AND SEMI-
SUBMERSIBLES  
The Joint Western Command has been responsible for most of the FARC’s semi-
submersible operations in the Pacific region. Although it is one of the smallest blocs 
within the FARC network, it is responsible for 65% of the FARC’s revenues. The Joint 
                                                 
94 Kushner, “Drug Sub Culture.” 
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Western Command has always used criminal networks, such as Los Rastrojos, to 
transport its cocaine to drug cartels in Central America and Mexico. Although Los 
Rastrojos continues to be the dominant actor in the cocaine-shipping network, evidence 
suggests that that Joint Western Command is now building its own semi-submersibles to 
increase its profit margin in the drug trade.95 Semi-submersible activity is concentrated 
along the coastal region from Tumaco in the south and moves north toward 
Buenaventura. Consisting of a large number of river systems that drain into the Pacific 
Ocean, this area is a prime location for semi-submersible operations. These river systems 
also contain vast mangroves that make traversing this terrain difficult while providing 
camouflage from the height of the mangroves. These mangroves then inhibit the 
detection of semi-submersible operations. In addition to the vegetation advantages 
provided by the Pacific region, drug traffickers also prefer the calmer and less-traveled 
waters of the Pacific Ocean to the Caribbean Ocean for shipping illicit goods. Pacific 
shorelines of Central America and Mexico are also better suited for illicit trafficking 
because they are less populated, which makes detection even more difficult. Due to the 
advantages provided by the Pacific Ocean and the favorable geography of Colombia’s 
western coast for drug trafficking, this study is focused on disrupting the semi-
submersible network in the Pacific. The following chapter describes the methodology for 
analyzing the semi-submersible network. 
                                                 




This chapter describes how the authors collected, structured, and analyzed data 
for the purpose of developing strategies to disrupt the semi-submersible network that 
funds the insurgency against the Colombian government. As noted in Chapter I, 
successfully attacking the semi-submersible network has the additional benefit of 
checking the proliferation of semi-submersible technology, which other terrorist networks 
could use for attacks.  
Past semi-submersible seizures indicate a greater success on land rather than at 
sea. Once semi-submersibles make it to the sea, they become almost impossible to find 
and interdict. Thus, it is assumed that semi-submersible operations can be hampered best 
by targeting the organizations that build, employ, and deploy them. To illuminate 
potential targeted organizations, this study first identified where most semi-submersible 
seizures are occurring. In the last 10 years, most have occurred in Colombia’s southwest 
Pacific region (see Figure 3, Chapter I). In addition, semi-submersible operations are 
increasing in Colombia’s northwest region due to the favorable concealment provided by 
coastal mangrove vegetation and the close proximity to Panama, as well as along 
Colombia’s Caribbean coast. Nevertheless, this study focuses on the FARC and criminal 
organizations in Colombia’s Pacific region since most semi-submersible seizures have 
occurred in this area. This chapter describes the data collection, data structuring, data 
metrics and analysis, and briefly touches on the strategic options for disruption of the 
semi-submersible network, which is expanded upon in Chapter V).  
B. DATA COLLECTION 
In gathering data on the semi-submersible network, it is assumed that the FARC, 
the ELN, and criminal organizations involved in the drug trade are also part of the semi-
submersible network. Most of the information on the FARC’s Joint Western Command 
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and location of its fronts and mobile companies comes from the Semana.com website.96 
Semana, one of Colombia’s largest news magazines, produces a web page on the FARC 
that provides a detailed description of the terror group’s history, sub-organizations, and 
their operational locations. In addition a report assembled by the Institute for Peace and 
Development (INDEPAZ), which is a Colombian non-governmental organization (NGO) 
that studies Colombia’s internal conflict,97 proved to be crucial in the building of the 
database because it identifies the criminal organizations involved in the Pacific drug trade 
and their specific locations. As noted in Chapter I, analysis of open source information 
found that the semi-submersible network is primarily comprised of various fronts and 
mobile companies within the FARC’s Joint Western Command, subgroups from the 
ELN, and various criminal networks, such Los Rastrojos, Urabeños, Renacer, and Los 
Machos. Data were also drawn from Colombian government and news websites.  
For example, data culled from press releases of the Colombian military and news 
articles published by Colombian and Mexican news organizations helped identify links 
between the FARC, Colombian criminal organizations, Mexican drug cartels, and semi-
submersibles. Many of these articles originated from Caracol, La Policiaca, Milenio, La 
Nación, Notimex, El Tiempo, CNN Mexico, and El Universal. Newspapers from Costa 
Rica and El Salvador, such as El Faro and La Gente, also provide important information 
on links between the FARC, Colombian criminal organizations, and Mexican drug 
cartels. Finally, the Colombia’s Navy website was an invaluable source for identifying 
the location of semi-submersible seizures in the last 10 years. It also provided 
information on the deployment of Marine organizations throughout the Pacific region, 
which enabled the authors to conduct a temporal analysis of the network and an 
assessment of the military operations against the semi-submersible network. 
Data compiled from all these sources yielded a semi-submersible database 
composed of 149 organizations. These organizations are composed of sub-organizations 
within the FARC, ELN, and the major criminal organizations. Table 3 illustrates the list 
of sources used to code and build the semi-submersible network database. 
                                                 
96 “Cual es la situatcion presente de la Farc?” Semana. 
97 Indepaz, “¿Quienes somos?, n.d., http://www.indepaz.org.co/?page_id=2. 
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Source Web Link 





3. State Department 
4. Milenio 
 
5. Colombia Reports 
6.  La Nacion 
7.  El Tiempo 
 
 
8.  Colombian Govt.  
9.  La Gente 
10.  El Faro 
11.  Guerra Contra El Narco 
12.  Notimex 
13.  El Universal 
14.  CNN Mexico 
15.  Informador.com.mx 
16.  El Espectador 
17.  RCN Radio 




19.  BBC 
20.  El Pais 
21.  CNP Website 
22.  Col. Govt. Magazine 
23.  Zonacero.info 
 
24.  El Colombiano 
25.  ABC 
26.  El Nuevo Siglo 
27.  Mangroves (ARCGIS) 
28.  Rivers (ARCGIS) 
29.  Road (ARCGIS) 
30.  Colombia (ARCGIS) 
31.  Unit locations (ARCGIS)  
32.  Location of semi-submersible 
seizures 
33.  FARC Website 
34.  Colombian Navy  
35.  Joint Western Command 
Organizations and Locations 
36.  List of Criminal Organizations 
and Locations 
1. http://www.lapoliciaca.com/nota-roja/ven-division-de-farc-y-carteles-mexicanos/ 
2.  a. http://www.caracol.com.co/noticias/judicial/alias-oliver-solarte-era-el-contacto-de-las-farc-con-carteles-mexicanos-revela-presidente-
santos/20110315/nota/1439851.aspx 
 b. http://www.caracol.com.co/noticias/judicial/golpes-a-la-farc-y-los-rastrojos-en-el-valle-del-cauca/20120825/nota/1750022.aspx 
 c.  http://www.noticiascaracol.com/nacion/video-241393-sumergible-de-farc-fue-incautado-autoridades 
3 http://www.state.gov/p/inl/narc/rewards/133311.htm 
4. a.  http://www.milenio.com/cdb/doc/noticias2011/a171a1241e5a048787f20d8c8e71b801 
 b.  http://www.rlp.com.ni/noticias/5442 
5.  http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/11604-farc-mexican-cartel-middlemen-captured-in-colombia.html 
6.  http://www.lanacion.com.co/2010/09/01/capturados-socios-de-capo-mexicano/ 
7.  a. http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-5441687 
 b. http://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/ARTICULO-WEB-NEW_NOTA_INTERIOR-10149344.html 
  c. http://www.eltiempo.com/Multimedia/galeria_fotos/colombia2/cae-otro-sumergible-de-las-farc_10440824-5 










18. a. http://www.semana.com/nacion/cinco-hombres-fueron-asesinados-tumaco-narino/179997-3.aspx 
 b. http://www.semana.com/nacion/cinco-muertos-deja-incursion-antioquia/178278-3.aspx 
 c. http://www.semana.com/nacion/estrategia-militar-atentados-tumaco-villa-rica-miranda/171459-3.aspx 















32. a. http://www.armada.mil.co/index.php?sI=&idcategoria=5&cadena_buscar=sumergibles&titulo= 
 b. http://www.armada.mil.co/search/node/semisumergibles 
33. www.anncol.info 
34. http://www.armada.mil.co  
35. http://www.semana.com/wf_multimedia.aspx?idmlt=601 
 
36. a. http://www.semana.com/documents/Doc-2153_2011323.pdf 
 b. http://www.semana.com/multimedia-nacion/farc-bacrim-eln-radiografia-del-conflicto/4743.aspx 
Table 3.   List of sources for the semi-submersible network database 
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C. LIMITATIONS OF DATA COLLECTION 
Open source data have their limitations. Improperly identified or included nodes 
and links can dramatically affect the results of the analysis. This type of study also 
requires multi-lingual experts to collect and translate the available documentation. 
Without these expert skills, data collection is severely hampered. Given these and other 
limitations in the analysis noted below, the results of this study should be viewed as 
tentative rather than definitive. As such, it offers suggestions for further study rather than 
conclusive recommendations for action. Other data sources combined with additional 
analyses are needed to build a comprehensive understanding of the semi-submersible 
network.98 This research illustrates how a network could be disrupted, but it does not 
assume, given the limitations of the data, how the semi-submersible network should be 
disrupted.  
D. DATA STRUCTURING AND SOFTWARE 
The second step in this analysis is data structuring. The Palantir software package 
was used for this step given the ease with which it could import, code, and structure the 
documents enumerated above.99 It also can export these data into the other software 
packages used in this study: ORA, UCINET, and NetDraw.100 
E. VISUAL ANALYTICS WITH PALANTIR 
Palantir is also used to analyze the data visually. Visual analytics is “the science 
of analytical reasoning facilitated by interactive visual interfaces.”101 The goal of this 
step is to synthesize and decipher available open source data, which is often ambiguous, 
conflicting, and dynamic, for discovering data trends and patterns. Palantir makes it 
possible to conduct link analysis on the open-source unstructured and structured data and 
                                                 
98 Sean Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks (New York: Cambridge Universtiy Press, 2012), 37.  
99 Palantir, “About,” n.d., http://www.palantir.com/about/. 
100 Casos, “*ORA,” n.d., http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/projects/ora/; UCINET Software, “Home,” 
n.d., https://sites.google.com/site/ucinetsoftware/home; S. P. Borgatti, NetDraw Software for Network 
Visualization (Lexington, KY: Analytic Technologies, 2002.) 
101 Nancy Roberts, “DA 3610 Visual Analytics,” Class Sylyabus, 2011. 
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show connections between and among actors, organizations, and semi-submersibles. It 
also allows the visualization of temporal and geospatial patterns within the semi-
submersible network to specify where the organizations are in the network at different 
points in time.  
F. VISUAL ANALYTICS WITH SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS  
SNA is the next step, and two software packages, UCINET and ORA, are central 
to this effort. SNA is able to dive deeper into the FARC and the criminal organizations 
involved in semi-submersible operations. A network is defined as a series of connections 
between two or more actors, which in this case, are organizations. Rather than treating 
actors are “independent automons,” SNA assumes that the pattern of ties in which actors 
are embedded impacts how they behave.102  
Once the 149 semi-submersible organizations in the semi-submersible network 
were identified, the authors created three one-mode networks based on the type of tie 
between the actors. The first network, the “member of” network, is composed of 
organizations that have organizational ties to other organizations within the network. In 
this network all FARC organizations and its sub-unit organizations in the Pacific are 
connected. In addition, every Rastrojos organization and its sub-organizations are 
connected. The second network, the “collaborates with” network, maps the collaboration 
ties between the FARC and criminal organizations. By using current news reports, the 
authors identified which FARC and criminal organizations are collaborating with one 
another to profit from the drug trade. In addition, they also assumed that FARC and 
criminal organizations operating at the same location are collaborating with one another 
as long as no evidence to the contrary exists (e.g., evidence indicating they are fighting 
with one another). The third network, the “enemy of network,” maps FARC and criminal 
organizations fighting for control of the drug trade that are tied to each other. 
A fourth network was created that mapped the ties between towns and 
organizations. In particular, it connects the FARC and criminal organizations operating in  
 
                                                 
102 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 2. 
 36 
the towns in which they operate. This network was transformed from a two mode to a one 
mode to stack the overall network. Once these four networks were created, they were 
combined in UCINET to create an overall semi-submersible network.  
G. SOCIAL NETWORK AND ANALYSIS 
When conducting SNA, one of the first steps of analysis is to understand the 
network’s topography, or its structure.103 The topography of the aggregated semi-
submersible network, previously described as a stacked network, explains the following 
metrics: size, density, and clustering coefficient. Size refers to the number of nodes or 
agents located in the network. In this case, the network includes 149 organizations. The 
second measure of topography is density, which is a measure of cohesion and is equal to 
the ratio of actual ties to the number of possible ties.104 More connected networks would 
have higher density scores or a higher cohesion, whereas lesser-connected networks 
would have lower scores.105 Clustering coefficient is the third measure used and is 
similar to density in that it provides insight on the degree of clustering, or tendency to 
form tight-knit groups amongst actors. A close, secretive network like the Ku Klux Klan, 
for example, would have a high clustering coefficient since the network is very cohesive. 
Centrality is the next set of measures used in the analysis of the semi-submersible 
network. It helps identify the most important actors within the network.106 Since the 
network analysis is conducted at the organizational level of analysis, it is possible to 
identify the most central organizations using four centrality measures.107 Degree 
centrality counts the number of ties each actor has108 and can identify well-known or 
popular actors in the network. A second centrality measure is betweenness, which 
                                                 
103 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 7. 
104 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 11. 
105 Although the density metric is useful, it has its limitations since this density score is sensitive to 
the size of the network. Larger networks have lower density scores than smaller networks; this metric 
should only be used when comparing networks of similar size.  
106 Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis (Structural Analysis in the 
Social Sciences (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012), Kindle Edition.  
107 Degree centrality, betweenness centrality, eigenvector centrality, and closeness centrality. 
108 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 12. 
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measures the extent to which an actor lies on the shortest path between all actors in a 
network.109 Actors with high betweenness centrality are in a position to control the 
spread of information through the network because they lie in a position of brokerage 
between other actors.110 A third measure is eigenvector centrality; it is similar to degree 
centrality except that it assumes that ties to central actors are more important than ties to 
peripheral actors.111 It measures how connected an actor is to other well-connected 
actors. The fourth centrality measure is closeness, which measures how close on average 
each actor is to all other actors in the network and may indicate the speed with which an 
actor can reach other actors in the network. 
Key player analysis is used in additional to the centrality analysis.112 One family 
of key player algorithms identifies the set of actors that best fragments the network when 
removed. Another set of algorithms identifies the set of actors that can be targeted to 
diffuse information most efficiently through a network. These algorithms can be useful 
when it is too difficult to remove actors within by force. For example, organizations 
identified for non-kinetic targeting can be attacked with information campaigns to create 
misinformation, mistrust, fear, or disillusionment within the network.113 
Finally, the analysis also identifies brokers. Brokers are key nodes, or actors, 
within the network that are in a position to control the flow of information. Similarly, 
bridges are the ties that span the gaps in a network. In Figure 13, the ties that connect 
node 15 with nodes 6, 8, and 9 (large circles) would be considered bridges, and the nodes 
are the brokers.114 When brokers in the semi-submersible network are removed, the end 
result is fragmentation or disconnection of the network. 
                                                 
109 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 13. 
110 Wouter de Nooy, Andrej Mrvar, and Vladimir Batagelj, Exploratory Social Network Analysis with 
Pajek (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 150. 
111 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 13. 
112 Stephen P. Borgatti, “The Key Player Problem,” Social Science Research Network, 1, September 
21, 2002, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1149843 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1149843. 
113 Dan Cunningham et al., Brokers and Key Players in the Internationalization of the FARC 
(Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 18.  




 The edges between actor 15 and actors 6, 8, and 9 are considered bridges Figure 13. 
while the four actors are considered brokers.115 
H. STRATEGIC OPTIONS 
Strategic options for disrupting a network can be kinetic or non-kinetic. Colombia 
has demonstrated an impressive adeptness at conducting kinetic operations. In the last 10 
years, its aggressive counterinsurgency strategy has killed or captured many of FARC’s 
top leaders and decimated many organizations within the network. Despite the gains 
made against the FARC, the threat of semi-submersibles continues to exist. Therefore, 
with evidence suggesting the FARC is using semi-submersibles to transport cocaine to 
Central America and Mexico, this thesis explores alternatives to disrupting the semi-
submersible network. Some of these options are kinetic; others are non-kinetic. Based on 
a decision matrix outlined in Chapter V, the authors identify one option that has in their 
view, greater advantages compared to the other two examined. As noted previously, their 
results and the recommendations that follow are only suggestions until a more 
comprehensive data set can be developed and analyzed.  
                                                 
115 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 6.  
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IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The difficulty of finding and interdicting semi-submersibles in the open seas 
requires targeting the FARC and criminal organizations in Colombia’s Pacific region that 
build and employ them for transporting drugs. By using the methodologies of visual 
analytics and SNA, the purpose of this chapter is to illuminate the organizations within 
the semi-submersible network to target. First, visual analytics are employed to conduct 
geospatial, temporal, and link analyses on the network. Results derived from visual 
analytics then inform the SNA of the semi-submersible network. Together, these two 
methodologies make it possible to identify those organizations that if weakened or 
removed have the greatest potential for disrupting semi-submersible operations in 
Colombia’s Pacific region. 
B. GEOSPATIAL AND TEMPORAL ANALYSIS 
Visual analytics, specifically geospatial analysis of the semi-submersible network, 
can help pinpoint areas for targeting. Historically, semi-submersible operations have 
occurred in the South Pacific area of Colombia since most seizures have occurred in that 
location.116 This area is an important drug-trafficking corridor for the FARC since it 
raises 65% of its revenues through drug trafficking. In addition, 70% of all cocaine 
entering the United States comes from Colombia’s Pacific coast.117 Recognizing the 
significance of the region for drug-trafficking operations, Colombia has increased its 
military presence in that area. The map in Figure 14 illustrates the locations of semi-
submersible seizures that have occurred in the last five years. 
                                                 
116 Mario Escobar, Lieutenant Colonel (Colombian Naval Infantry), interview with Major Rick 
Galeano (U.S. Army), December 1, 2011. 




 Semi-submersible seizures in the Pacific 2007–2011 Figure 14. 
As Figure 14 indicates, semi-submersible activity is concentrated along the 
coastal region from Tumaco in the south and moves north towards Sanquianga National 
Park and Buenaventura. Since this area contains a large numbers of river systems and 
estuaries that drain into the Pacific Ocean, it has become a prime location for semi-
submersible operations. Typically, semi-submersibles are built close to the ocean in these 
river systems underneath mangrove vegetation. Building semi-submersible sites close to 
the ocean is a prerequisite because, upon completion, these underwater vehicles will 
travel downstream to the estuaries and begin their voyage into the Pacific Ocean. Since 
semi-submersibles are built in remote areas inaccessible from roads, these rivers serve as 
highways that transport the materials required for building. In addition, vast mangroves 
cover these river systems that make traversing the terrain difficult for the following two 






height of the mangroves camouflages semi-submersible operations. The following map 
(Figure 15) shows how mangrove vegetation extends from Ecuador to Panama. The 
combination of the vegetation, river systems, and close proximity to the sea, makes the 
Pacific coastline an ideal location for semi-submersible operations. 
 
 Map illustrates the mangrove vegetation in Colombia’s Pacific region. Figure 15. 
Mangrove vegetation extends from northern Ecuador to Panama.  
Despite the favorable mangrove vegetation along Colombia’s Pacific coast and 
the extensive river systems that drain into the ocean, most semi-submersible seizures 
have occurred between the cities of Tumaco and Buenaventura, as illustrated in the 
following semi-submersible heat map (Figure 16). Close proximity to these two large 
population centers makes sense given the logistics required to construct these underwater 
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vehicles. They require fiberglass material and engine and vehicle components for their 
construction. In addition, an estimated workforce of 20 people, all of whom need shelter, 
are more likely to be found in a population center rather than in remote areas.  
 
 
 Heat map demonstrates where most semi-submersible seizures are Figure 16. 
occurring. Most semi-submersible seizures are occurring near Tumaco, El 
Charco, and Buenaventura.  
Using data published by Jane’s Defense website, FARC attacks were plotted from 
2002–2007 to identify areas within the Pacific region of greatest FARC activity. As 
illustrated in Figure 17, attacks from 2000–2002 occurred primarily closer inland, near 
the city of Cali. The areas colored red reflect a high density of FARC attacks, whereas 
those colored blue represent a smaller number of FARC activities. Figure 18 plots FARC 
attacks from 2003–2005, and illustrates that during this time FARC activities increased in 
Buenaventura. The increased activities could also suggest that this terror group is 






 Colored areas represent FARC attacks. Areas in red represent a high density Figure 17. 
of FARC incidents, whereas the areas in blue represent a lower 
concentration of activities. From 2000–2002, FARC activities primarily 
focused towards the interior of the country.  
 
 From 2003–2005, diagram indicates that FARC activities are increasing Figure 18. 
Buenaventura 
Figure 19, which plots FARC activities from 2005–2007, reveals that the FARC 
has increased its activities in both Tumaco, Buenaventura, and also in the northern part of 
the Pacific, near the border with Panama. Greater FARC activity in these two cities 
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suggests that the FARC considers these two urban centers important to its drug 
trafficking operations, whereas its activities near Panama suggest that this area is 
important for the insurgency. Although past semi-submersible seizures confirm that most 
have been built by criminal organizations, such as Los Rastrojos, two recent seizures of 
FARC semi-submersibles in Timbiqui and Buenaventura demonstrate that this terror 
group is now an active player in semi-submersible operations. More importantly, the 
FARC’s semi-submersible operations in the area and its increasing activities in Tumaco 
and Buenaventura point to the strategic importance of this region. Due to the geographic 
location of these two cities, the rivers, and the mangrove vegetation along the coast, this 
area appears to be strategically advantageous to both the FARC and criminal 




 From 2005–2007, diagram indicates that FARC activities are increasing Figure 19. 








The Colombian military has not underestimated the strategic value of the 
Southwest Pacific region to FARC drug trafficking operations. Beginning in 2003, 
Colombia has increased its military presence in the area by permanently deploying 
marine units to disrupt FARC and cocaine trafficking activities by stationing six 
battalions in the areas of Buenaventura and Tumaco (see Figure 20).118  
 
 Map illustrates semi-submersible seizures from 2003–2008 conducted by Figure 20. 
the Pacific Coast Guard and Riverine Brigade #2119 
Figure 21 illustrates the increase of security forces’ seizures in two cities that 
have resulted in the capture of 31 semi-submersibles. As a consequence of the military’s 
pressure, criminal organizations have begun to expand their operations to the north 
towards Panama and the south towards Ecuador (see Figure 22).  
                                                 
118 Mario Escobar, Lieutenant Colonel (Colombian Naval Infantry), interview with Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, December 1, 2011. 






 Map illustrates semi-submersible seizures from 2009–2010 conducted by Figure 21. 
the U.S. Coast Guard, Colombian Coast Guard, and Riverine Brigade #2 
 
 
 Map illustrates semi-submersible seizures from 2011–2012 conducted by Figure 22. 
the Riverine Brigade #2 and Riverine Brigade #4. Presence of Colombia’s 
security forces is likely causing semi-submersible operations to expand to 
the north (Panama) and the south (Ecuador) 
Panama 
Ecuador





C. LINK ANALYSIS  
From 2011 news reports, evidence was discovered that the 57th Front is 
increasing its ties with Mexican drug trafficking networks and filling the vacuum left by 
the Guajira drug cartel operating in Northern Ecuador. The 48th Front also associates 
with key players of the semi-submersible network (See Figure 23). Although it has 
always been tied with the 30th Front in the southwest, the Rastrojos criminal organization 
is now forming ties with the 48th Front, which suggests that FARC semi-submersible 
operations may begin to occur south of Colombia’s border in Ecuador. The terrain is 
compatible with this expansion since the mangrove vegetation also extends to the 
northwest part of the Ecuadorian coastline (refer back to Figure 15). In addition, since the 
Rastrojos criminal organization is originally from this area of Ecuador, a partnership with 




 Link analysis demonstrates that the FARC’s 57th Front (near Panama) is Figure 23. 
increasing drug trafficking activities in the Colombia’s northwest Pacific 
region. Drug trafficking activities from the 48th Front and Rastrojos 
Criminal Organization are also increasing in Ecuador as well.  
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D. SUMMARY OF GEOSPATIAL, TEMPORAL, AND LINK ANALYSES  
The analyses of semi-submersible operations have illuminated areas in the Pacific 
region that deserve attention. The geospatial and temporal analyses converge on the cities 
of Tumaco and Buenaventura, which are becoming more central to the FARC’s drug 
trafficking activities. The FARC’s presence in these areas has increased in the last seven 
years, which points to a strategic shift in the area of responsibility (AOR). In addition, in 
the last year, two FARC semi-submersibles have been seized in this part of the region 
that suggests that FARC business expansion includes cocaine transportation and semi-
submersible construction.  
The increased number of semi-submersible seizures in the area has likely 
precipitated expansion of semi-submersible operations in the north and the south. More 
specifically, geospatial and link analysis of the 57th Front (see Figure 23), which operates 
in the northern region close to Panama in an area that also favors semi-submersible 
operations, reinforces the view that semi-submersible operations are moving into more 
hospitable terrain. Figure 23 also suggests expansion into southern Ecuador since ties 
between the Rastrojos criminal organization and the 48th Front are also increasing. The 
link analysis, which was constructed by using recent news reports, is supported by a 
January 2009 news article by El País, which reported that Colombian intelligence has 
proof of the 48th Front allying itself with the Rastrojos criminal organization in 
Ecuador.120 Due to the favorable vegetation, geography, and reduced presence of security 
forces from Panama and Ecuador, it is likely that semi-submersible operations are 
expanding along the Pacific coastline. 
E. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS  
Although the author’s visual analytic examination of the data proved invaluable 
for pinpointing the location of FARC and criminal groups, their movement through time, 
and their linkages, social network analysis makes it possible to take a much closer look  
 
                                                 
120 Colprensa, “Cae red de narcos associate con las Farc,” El País, January 2009, 
http://historico.elpais.com.co/paisonline/notas/Enero162009/jud1.html. 
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into the data to explore the relational patterns of the network. Their ultimate goal in this 
section is to identify targeting options that have the greatest potential to disrupt the semi-
submersible network.  
F. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS—SIZE AND GENERAL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
The SNA analysis begins with open-source data on 149 FARC and criminal 
organizations involved in drug-trafficking operations that operate in close proximity to 
submersible seizures. Figure 24 depicts the locations of the 149 organizations located in 
the Pacific region. As it illustrates, the nodes within the semi-submersible network are 
represented by various FARC Fronts, Mobile Columns, and sub-organizations that work 
for the ELN, Rastrojos, Renacer, Los Machos, and Urabenos. The semi-submersible 
network in Figure 25 was produced using ORA, which visually demonstrates that the 
FARC’s Joint Western Command and the Rastrojos criminal organizations are central in 
the semi-submersible network. Other organizations depicted as important include the 
following: Rastrojos-Narino, Rastrojos-Cauca, Rastrojos-Choco, Rastrojos-Valle del 
Cauca, Machos-Valle del Cauca, Renacer-Choco, Urabenos-Grupo Choco; Renacer-
















 Locations of the FARC and criminal organizations comprising the semi-Figure 24. 
submersible network. Diagram was produced using ORA and ARCGIS. 
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 This figure represents an illustration of the mapped semi-submersible Figure 25. 
network. The figure was developed using ORA SNA software. 
G. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS—CENTRALIZATION 
Centralization analysis of the semi-submersible network reveals a balance 
between centralization and decentralization (see Table 4). The network’s high 
betweenness centralization score (.738) indicates that in certain respects the network is 
very centralized. In this case, the network revolves around a broker in a position to 
control the flow of resources through the network, in particular, the FARC’s Joint 
Western Command, which is not surprising since the FARC has a formal organizational 
structure that operates with the purpose of achieving its political objectives. Whereas (for 
example) the Rastrojos criminal organizations is much more decentralized (see Figure 
25) because its primary purpose is to profit from the drug trade. Furthermore, since 
building semi-submersibles requires a significant investment, the involvement of higher-




























0.067 0.738 Centralized 0.03 0.238 Decentralized 0.021 0.107 Decentralized 0.1 0.444 Middle
SUBNETWORK 11 0 0 Decentralized 0 0 Decentralized 0 0 Decentralized 0 0 Decentralized
SUBNETWORK 10 0.149 0.4 Middle 0.131 0.5 Middle 0.249 0.4 Middle 0.174 0.155 Decentralized
SUBNETWORK 9 0.253 0.698 Middle 0.106 0.599 Middle 0.179 0.556 Middle 0.188 0.565 Middle
SUBNETWORK 8 0.172 0.716 Centralized 0.119 0.526 Middle 0.219 0.417 Middle 0.22 0.644 Middle
SUBNETWORK 7 0.172 0.592 Middle 0.119 0.607 Middle 0.219 0.436 Middle 0.22 0.255 Decentralized
SUBNETWORK 6 0.164 0.638 Centralized 0.095 0.585 Middle 0.14 0.445 Middle 0.151 0.314 Decentralized
SUBNETWORK 5 0.126 0.366 Decentralized 0.059 0.232 Decentralized 0.135 0.164 Decentralized 0.245 0.355 Decentralized
SUBNETWORK 4 0.18 0.687 Centralized 0.08 0.519 Middle 0.154 0.404 Middle 0.239 0.397 Decentralized
SUBNETWORK 3 0.156 0.48 Middle 0.094 0.498 Middle 0.135 0.417 Middle 0.18 0.467 Middle
SUBNETWORK 2 0.14 0.553 Middle 0.079 0.412 Middle 0.113 0.228 Decentralized 0.212 0.355 Decentralized
SUBNETWORK 1 0.163 0.582 Middle 0.079 0.516 Middle 0.122 0.448 Middle 0.157 0.536 Middle  
Table 4.   This table represents the centralization scores for both the overall semi-submersible network and its 11 most 
important subgroups. The subgroups were identified by using the Girvan-Newman analysis.121 
                                                 
121 Dan Cunningham provided assistance with calculating the semi-submersible network centralization scores. 
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The network’s low closeness (.238) and degree (.107) centralization scores 
indicate that the overall network is decentralized along other dimensions (see Table 4). 
which makes sense since too much centralization would probably hamper the network’s 
ability to generate a profit in drug trafficking and semi-submersible operations since 
hierarchical organizations tend to be less efficient as decentralized organizations when 
operating in rapidly changing environments. Decision making in hierarchical 
organizations is deliberate and passes through several steps of approval before decisions 
are actually made.122 As a result, they can be cumbersome, time-consuming, and 
inefficient when decisions have to be made quickly, such as in drug trafficking 
operations. It appears that the FARC recognized the limitations of its hierarchical design 
and structured itself so that while strategic decisions are made from the top, military and 
criminal operations are made at the tactical level. When examining the semi-submersible 
network, it is likely that a centralized-decentralized balance is required since semi-
submersibles necessitate a substantial investment from high-level organizations, but 
decentralized control is essential for maximum performance of the network.  
To verify that the network is indeed decentralized at the lower level, a subgroup 
centralization analysis was conducted. By conducting a Girvan-Newman (GN) analysis, 
the authors identified the 11 most important subgroups in the semi-submersible network. 
Once identified, they conducted a centralization analysis on each of the subgroups and 
found that some of the subgroups are more decentralized than others (see Table 4). Since 
the centralization scores at the subgroup level range from being centralized to 
decentralized, these findings also support that the network is both hierarchical and 
heterarchical. The lower-level organizations within the network must have the flexibility 
to make decisions and seize opportunities to profit from the drug trade. The environment 
is dynamic, and since the drug trade is so profitable, it is common to find low-level 
FARC organizations collaborating with criminal organizations to maximize revenues. 
Likewise, if lower organizations are unable to cooperate to increase earnings, fighting 
between FARC and criminal organizations will result since they will compete for profits. 
                                                 
122 Frank Ostroff, The Horizontal Organization (New York, NY: Oxford University Press), 4. 
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Due to the network’s efficiency and capacity to generate large profits, the semi-
submersible network appears to operate between the two extremes since the network 
displays both formal and informal characteristics.  
As a final test, the authors collapsed (shrunk, simplified) the network in which all 
the organizations in each of the subgroups are replaced by a single node representing that 
subgroup.123 “This type of analysis is something [analysts] choose to do when [they] are 
interested in examining the pattern of ties between types of actors rather than the pattern 
of ties between the actors themselves… [because it can help] illuminate patterns that [are] 
note detectable at the ‘street level view,’ so to speak.”124 Figure 26 presents the collapsed 
network composed of the 11 subgroups. More importantly, centralization analysis of the 
collapsed network indicates a relatively high level of centralization across all measures of 
centralization (see Table 5): degree -.590, centralization -.529, closeness -.706, and 
eigenvector -.420. These scores lend further empirical evidence that the network has both 
centralized and decentralized aspects to it. 
 
 Collapsed Girvan-Newman Subgroups of semi-submersible network Figure 26. 
                                                 
123 de Nooy, Mrvar, and Batagelj, Exploratory Social Network Analysis with Pajek , 46–47. 








Table 5.   This table  represents the centralization scores for both the overall semi-
submersible network and its 11 most important subgroups. The subgroups 
were identified by using the Girvan-Newman analysis.125  
H. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS—CENTRALITY 
To illuminate the important lower-level units in the semi-submersible network, 
the authors calculated various measures of centrality. Developing an effective targeting 
list requires identifying the principal lower-level organizations since targeting a high-
level organization is difficult since they have numerous security rings protecting them 
and their primary leadership often resides in other countries. A more easily targeted 
lower-level organization can be a tactical unit, such as a company from the FARC or 
ELN. Knowing which lower-level organizations to remove from the network or target for 
misinformation campaigns will result in the best outcome when attacking semi-
submersible operations. 
Table 6 lists the top 15 organizations in terms of degree, closeness, betweenness, 
and eigenvector centrality. The higher-level organizations with the top centrality 
measures included the following: The Joint Western Command (ranked #1 in degree, 
betweenness, and closeness scores, ranked #9 in Eigenvector score), Rastrojos-Narino 
(ranked #2 in betweenness and closeness), Rastrojos-Choco (ranked #5 in betweenness 
and #4 in closeness), Rastrojos-Cauca (ranked #3 in betweenness and #5 in closeness), 
M. C. Miller Perdomo Staff (ranked #2 in degree and eigenvector), the 30th Front Staff 
(ranked #3 in degree and #1 in eigenvector), and Urabeños-Grupo Choco (ranked #4 in 
betweenness and #3 in closeness). As demonstrated by their high centrality scores, the 
                                                 
125 Dan Cunningham provided assistance with collapsing the GN Network and calculating its 
centralization scores. 
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Joint Western Command and the Rastrojos criminal organization are crucial players in 
the semi-submersible network. These findings also support the link and geospatial 
analysis conducted using the visual analytics methodology. 
However, illuminating the important lower-level organizations in the semi-
submersible network requires a closer analysis. Thus, lower-level organizations that 
ranked in the top 30 in more than one centrality measure were identified and are 
highlighted in gray in Table 6. 
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DEGREE BETWEENNESS CLOSENESS EIGENVECTOR 
RANK ORGANIZATION SCORE RANK ORGANIZATION SCORE RANK ORGANIZATION SCORE RANK ORGANIZATION SCORE 
1 JOINT WEST COMMAND 0.056 1 JOINT WEST COMMAND 0.761 1 JOINT WEST COMMAND 51.015 1 30TH FRONT - STAFF 0.555 
2 
M.C. MILLER PERDOMO 
- STAFF 0.044 2 RASTROJOS -NARIÑO 0.241 2 RASTROJOS - NARIÑO 36.07 2 
M.C. MILLER PERDOMO- 
STAFF 0.539 
3 30TH FRONT - STAFF 0.037 3 RASTROJOS - CAUCA 0.226 3 
URABEÑOS - GRUPO 
CHOCO 35.816 3 
M.C. MILLER PERDOMO - 
3RD COMP. 0.504 
4 8TH FRONT - STAFF 0.035 4 
URABEÑOS - GRUPO 
CHOCO 0.167 4 RASTROJOS - CHOCO 35.689 4 30TH FRONT - MASS COMP. 0.461 
5 ELN - SPECIAL TROOPS 0.034 5 RASTROJOS - CHOCO 0.155 5 RASTROJOS - CAUCA 35.188 5 30TH FRONT – 3RD COMP. 0.461 
6 
MOBILE BLOCK 
CARLOS ARTURO RUIZ 
- STAFF 0.034 6 
RASTROJOS - VALLE 




VARGAS - STAFF 0.032 7 
MOBILE BLOCK 
CARLOS ARTURO RUIZ 
- STAFF 0.106 7 
RASTROJOS - VALLE DEL 
CAUCA 34.084 7 30TH FRONT – 1ST COMP. 0.461 
8 
M.C. MILLER 
PERDOMO- 3RD COMP. 0.03 8 
MOBILE COMPANY 
VICTOR SAAVEDRA – 
STAFF 0.104 8 
MACHOS - VALLE DEL 
CAUCA 33.014 8 
RASTROJOS - CAUCA - 
LOPEZ DE MICAY 0.433 
9 29TH FRONT - STAFF 0.03 9 
MACHOS - VALLE DEL 
CAUCA 0.067 9 
MOBILE BLOCK CARLOS 
ARTURO RUIZ - STAFF 25.037 9 JOINT WEST COMMAND 0.133 
10 
MOBILE COLUMN 
LIBARDO GARCIA - 
STAFF. 0.03 10 
RASTROJOS -NARIÑO – 
BARBACOAS 0.066 10 
URABEÑOS - GRUPO 
CHOCO - ITSMINA 24.223 10 
RASTROJOS - CAUCA – 
SUAREZ 0.133 
11 6TH FRONT- STAFF 0.029 11 RENACER - CHOCO 0.054 11 
RASTROJOS- CHOCO - 
ITSMINA 24.046 11 
MOBILE BLOCK CARLOS 
ARTURO RUIZ - STAFF 0.115 
12 60TH FRONT STAFF 0.029 12 60TH FRONT STAFF 0.053 12 
RENACER - CHOCO - 
ITSMINA 23.431 12 
M.C.MILLER PERDOMO – 




STAFF. 0.029 13 
URABEÑOS - GRUPO 
CHOCO - RIO SUCIO 0.052 13 
RASTROJOS - NARIÑO - 
BARBACOAS 23.085 13 
M.C.MILLER PERDOMO - 




- STAFF 0.027 14 
RASTROJOS - CAUCA - 
LOPEZ DE MICAY 0.05 14 
RASTROJOS - CAUCA - 
LOPEZ DE MICAY 22.574 14 
RASTROJOS- CHOCO – 
CONDOTO 0.07 
15 
8TH FRONT – 2ND 
COMP. 0.027 15 
29TH FRONT - STAFF, 
RASTROJOS – 
BUENAVENTURA 0.047 15 
MOBILE COMPANY 
VICTOR SAAVEDRA - 
STAFF 22.155 15 
M.C. MILLER PERDOMO - 
2ND COMP. 0.069 
16 8TH FRONT – 3RD 
COMP. 
0.027 16 RASTROJOS - VALLE 
DEL CAUCA - 
BUENAVENTURA 
0.047 16 6 FRONT- STAFF 22.072 16 8 FRONT - STAFF 0.06 
17 8 FRONT - LOG COMP. 0.027 17 MOBILE COLUMN 
MARISCAL SUCRE - 
STAFF. 
0.045 17 RASTROJOS- NARIÑO - 
TUMACO 
21.989 17 URBAN FRONT MANUEL 
CEPEDA VARGAS - STAFF 
0.059 
18 MOBILE COLUMN 
MARISCAL SUCRE - 
STAFF. 
0.027 18 RASTROJOS - CAUCA - 
EL TAMBO 
0.042 18 POLITICAL COMPANY 
AMBROSIO GONZALES- 
STAFF 
21.907 18 MOBILE COLUMN 
LIBARDO GARCIA - STAFF. 
0.049 
19 30TH FRONT – 2ND 
COMP. 
0.025 19 MOBILE COLUMN 
GABRIEL GALVIS - 
STAFF. 
0.042 19 URABEÑOS - GRUPO 
CHOCO - RIO SUCIO 
21.907 19 RASTROJOS - CAUCA 0.047 
20 30TH RONT – 1ST COMP. 0.025 20 RASTROJOS-NARIÑO - 
TUMACO 
0.04 20 RASTROJOS - CAUCA - 
SUAREZ 
21.742 20 8 FRONT - 2 COMP. 0.041 
21 30TH FRONT - MASS 
COMP. 
0.025 21 ELN- SPECIAL TROOPS 0.039 21 RASTROJOS- CHOCO - 
CONDOTO 
21.742 21 8 FRONT - 3 COMP. 0.041 
22 30TH FRONT – 3RD 
COMP. 
0.025 22 MOBILE COLUMN 
LIBARDO GARCIA - 
STAFF. 
0.035 22 RASTROJOS - VALLE DEL 
CAUCA - BUENAVENTURA 
21.66 22 8 FRONT - LOG COMP. 0.041 
23 MOBILE COLUMN 
ALIRIO TORRES - 
STAFF. 
0.025 23 POLITICAL COMPANY 
AMBROSIO GONZALES- 
STAFF 
0.034 23 RASTROJOS - CAUCA - EL 
TAMBO 
21.578 23 RASTROJOS - VALLE DEL 
CAUCA - BUENAVENTURA 
0.037 
24 RASTROJOS - CAUCA - 
LOPEZ DE MICAY 
0.025 24 MOBILE COLUMN 
ALIRIO TORRES - 
STAFF. 
0.03 24 RASTROJOS- NARIÑO - EL 
CHARCO 
21.497 24 MOBILE COLUMN 
LIBARDO GARCIA- 1 
COMP. 
0.037 
25 MOBILE COMPANY 
VICTOR SAAVEDRA - 
STAFF 
0.024 25 57 FRONT STAFF 0.028 25 RASTROJOS - CAUCA - 
TIMBIQUI 
21.416 25 MOBILE COLUMN 
LIBARDO GARCIA- 2 
COMP. 
0.037 
26 RASTROJOS- CHOCO 0.024 26 CENTRAL STAFF 0.026 26 RASTROJOS- CHOCO - 
BOJAYA 
21.335 26 6 FRONT- STAFF 0.032 
27 POLITICAL COMPANY 
AMBROSIO GONZALES- 
MASS COMP. 
0.022 27 M.C. JACOBO ARENAS- 
STAFF 
0.024 27 RASTROJOS- NARIÑO - 
MAGUI 
21.335 27 URBAN FRONT MANUEL 
CEPEDA VARGAS - 1 
COMP. 
0.032 
28 MOBILE COLUMN 
GABRIEL GALVIS - 
STAFF. 
0.022 28 M.C. MILLER 
PERDOMO- STAFF 
0.021 28 RASTROJOS- NARIÑO - 
ROBERTO PAYAN 
21.335 28 URBAN FRONT MANUEL 




DEGREE BETWEENNESS CLOSENESS EIGENVECTOR 
RANK ORGANIZATION SCORE RANK ORGANIZATION SCORE RANK ORGANIZATION SCORE RANK ORGANIZATION SCORE 
29 RASTROJOS - VALLE 
DEL CAUCA - 
BUENAVENTURA 
0.022 29 6 FRONT- STAFF 0.021 29 RASTROJOS- NARIÑO - 
FRANCISCO PIZARRO 
21.173 29 URBAN FRONT MANUEL 
CEPEDA VARGAS - 
LOG.COMP. 
0.032 
30 6TH FRONT – 3RD 
COMP. 
0.02 30 URBAN FRONT 
MANUEL CEPEDA 
VARGAS - STAFF 
0.018 30 RASTROJOS- NARIÑO - LA 
TOLA 
21.173 30 RASTROJOS- CHOCO - 
ITSMINA 
0.032 
Table 6.   Top lower-level organizations with highest centrality scores are shaded grey. Results were calculated using 
ORA SNA software. 
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I. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS—KEY PLAYER 
To identify additional lower-level organizations for targeting, Borgatti’s key 
player algorithms were used. As noted in the previous chapter, one key player algorithm 
identifies the organizations to remove for fragmenting the network, whereas the other 
determines the organizations best for diffusing misinformation. When this analysis was 
used to identify which top 15 organizations to target, the fragmentation algorithm 
identified one low level organization (Political Company Ambrosio Gonzales-foreign 
relation comp.), whereas the algorithm for diffusing information identified three (6th 
Front-1st Comp., ELN Special Troops, and M. C. Jacobo Arenas-2nd Company). Table 7 
presents the results of the key player analysis. 
 
Key Player Analysis 
Organizations to Remove from the 
Semi-Submersible Network 
Key Player Analysis 
Organizations to Spread Misinformation 
Through the Semi-Submersible Network 
Organization Organization 
M.C. Miller Perdomo-Staff 57th Front-Staff 
M.C. Jacobo Arenas-Staff 6th Front -1st Comp. 
Mobile Column Alirio Torres-Staff M.C. Miller Perdomo-Staff 
Mobile Column Victor Saavedra Staff M.C. Jacobo Arenas-2 comp. 
Political Company Ambrosio Gonzales-
foreign relation comp. (F.R.C.) ELN- Special Troops 
29th Front-Staff Mobile Company Victor Saavedra-Staff 
Mobile Column Gabriel Galvis-Staff Mobile Column Libardo Garcia-Staff 
Mobile Column Libardo Garcia-Staff Central Staff 




Rastrojos-Valle del Cauca Rastrojos-Valle del Cauca 
Renacer-Choco Renacer-Choco 
Urabeños-Grupo Choco Urabeño-Grupo Choco 
Table 7.   Top lower-level organizations with highest key player scores 
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J. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS—RESULTS 
ELN special troops, which had not been illuminated by previous analyses, scored 
high in terms of degree (ranked #5) and betweenness centrality (ranked #21) (see Table 
6). In addition, key player analysis determined that the ELN Special Troops should be 
targeted for the spreading of misinformation (see Table 7). The ELN Special Troops 
importance is also demonstrated by its key geographic location since it operates in 
Colombia’s densest coca growing area in the Southwest Pacific (see Figure 27). Since the 
ELN ranked high along a number of different dimensions, the authors concluded that this 
lower-level organization is one of the most important in the semi-submersible network. 
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 Location of where the ELN Special Troops operate, which is one of the Figure 27. 
most important coca-growing regions of southwest Colombia126 
Another important criminal organization is the Rastrojos Valle-del Cauca-
Buenaventura. Not only did it rank high in terms of degree (29), betweenness (16), and 
closeness centrality (22), numerous semi-submersibles have been seized near the city of 
Buenaventura. Another lower-level criminal organization not identified previously is the 
                                                 







Rastrojos-Cauca-Lopez de Micay organization. Like the Rastrojos Valle-del Cauca-
Buenaventura, this organization ranked high in terms of degree (#24), betweenness (#14), 
closeness (#14), and eigenvector (#8), and it operates in the vicinity between 
Buenaventura and Sanguianga National Park, which are prime locations for semi-
submersible operations. 
The 2nd and 3rd companies of the FARC’s 30th front, which operate in the same 
area as Los Rastrojos-Cauca-Lopez de Micay, were also identified as important low-level 
organizations in the semi-submersible network. The 2nd Company ranked high in terms 
of degree (19) and eigenvector centrality (6), as did the 3rd Company (degree = 22, 
eigenvector = 5). Due to their high centrality scores and key geographic location, these 
companies appear to be two of the FARC’s most critical units in the semi-submersible 
network. 
K. RECOMMENDED TARGETING LIST 
Table 8 lists the most important lower-level organizations in the semi-submersible 
network illuminated using SNA methodology and should be targeted to attack 
submersible operations effectively. Table 9 identifies the towns in which these lower-
level organizations operate.  
 
Rank Organization 
1 Rastrojos, Lopez de Micay 
2 Rastrojos, Buenaventura 
3 ELN Special Troops 
4 30th Front-Mass Comp. 
5 30th Front-2nd Comp. 
6 30th Front-3rd Comp. 
Table 8.   This table represents the optimum list of organizations to target. The SNA 
methodology illuminated the most important lower—level organization in 







Important Geographic Towns For Semi-Submersible Operations 
1. Lopez de Micay 
2. Buenaventura 
3. Guachavez 
Table 9.   Important geographic towns in the semi-submersible network 
The following chapter provides strategic recommendations of attack methods on 
the most important lower-level organizations in the semi-submersible network for 
decision makers to consider. 
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V. RECOMMENDED STRATEGIC OPTIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of the previous chapter was to identify which semi-submersible 
organizations to target to produce the greatest effect in disrupting the network. Geospatial 
analysis enabled the identification of geographic locations and patterns, and SNA 
generated a target list in line with the results obtained using visual analytic techniques. 
Indeed, the combined use of visual analytics and SNA was instrumental in illuminating 
six of the most important organizations and three of the key towns in the semi-
submersible network.  
The aim of this chapter is to identify three strategic options and to recommend 
one that appears to have a greater likelihood of undermining the submersible 
organizational network. To achieve this objective, the semi-submersible network on the 
design continuum was first located to identify which of the organizations among those 
selected are better candidates for targeting. Secondly, three options for targeting, explore 
their advantages and disadvantages are described, and then ultimately, one is 
recommended to the Colombian government for implementation.  
B. NETWORK DESIGN CONTINUUM 
Understanding where a network fits in the design continuum can assist decision 
makers in developing and implementing strategies to attack the network. As mentioned in 
Chapter IV, networks that are either too centralized (hierarchical) or too decentralized 
(heterarchical) tend not to perform as efficiently or effectively as those that operate in the 
middle of the network design continuum.  
In the case of the semi-submersible network, two tendencies are found that appear 
to counterbalance each other. The centralizing tendency is likely to come from the need 
to manage investment risks and protect profits. Building a semi-submersible is a 
substantial financial investment that can cost up to $1 million. It is reasonable to assume 
that a few organizations rather than the entire network would manage and direct these 
investment decisions. The high centralization scores (refer to Chapter IV for network 
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centralization scores) of the FARC’s Joint Western Command and the Rastrojos criminal 
organization support this view. Indeed, it would appear that the semi-submersible 
network has adopted the lead organization network governance mode as illustrated in 
Figure 28 to manage its investments and financial decisions.  
 
 The semi-submersible network has adopted a lead organization network in Figure 28. 
its management design127 
To counterbalance this centralization, the network appears to decentralize some of 
its decisions. Although the data does not allow the tracking of specific decisions, the 
variation among the sub groups in terms of their centralization and decentralization 
metrics suggests decentralization is co-occurring with centralization. Therefore, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that the semi-submersible network has positioned itself (either 
deliberately or inadvertently) in the mid-range of the design continuum (see Figure 29) to 
gain the advantages of both centralization and decentralization.  
                                                 
127 H. Brinton Milward and Keith G. Provan, “A Manager's Guide to Choosing and Using 





 The semi-submersible network appears to operate in the middle of the Figure 29. 
network design continuum128 
In summary, the authors speculate that the FARC’s Joint Western Command and 
the Rastrojos criminal organization are serving as key decision makers that oversee the 
semi-submersible investments and protect the network’s profits. Other organizations in 
the network appear to retain decision authority over issues less strategic in nature, most 
likely operational and tactical decisions that enable the network to be adaptive and 
flexible at the local levels. The implications for this division of labor and the positioning 
of the semi-submersible on the design continuum are addressed in the next section.  
C. TARGETING THE NETWORK  
Chapter IV provided a useful process for mapping the semi-submersible network 
and illuminating a subset of organizations for targeting. Based on centrality measures 
from the SNA analysis, Colombia would more than likely prioritize its security resources 
against the FARC’s Joint Western Command and the Rastrojos criminal organization. 
Both organizations are important for different reasons. The FARC fights to assume power 
in Colombia and the Rastrojos criminal business fights to maximize profits from the drug 
trade. Both employ violence in the pursuit of semi-submersible operations129 to achieve 
their ends. 
However, based on the author’s analysis in Chapter IV, it is recommended that 
the government focus on targeting lower-level organizations for the following reasons. 
First, high-level organizations are more difficult to attack. Targeting the Joint Western 
                                                 
128 Nancy Roberts, “MN4123: Organizing and Planning in Complex Networks,” (lecture, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 17, 2012). 
129 “Nariño se desangra,” n.d., Semana, http://m.semana.com/conflicto-armado/narino-
desangra/123419-3.aspx. 
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Command, for example, is difficult because the leadership is protected by numerous 
security rings and also resides in other countries, such as Ecuador and Venezuela. 
Colombian security forces killed Former Secretariat member Raul Reyes, for example, in 
Ecuador in 2008, and Ivan Marquez, the second highest-ranking leader of the FARC, 
openly resides in Venezuela.130 Similar to the FARC, evidence also suggests that high-
level leaders of the Rastrojos criminal organization also reside in other countries since its 
former leader, Diego Perez Henao, was captured in Venezuela earlier this year.131  
Secondly, it appears to be more difficult for the FARC and criminal organizations 
to replace trustworthy mid-level leaders than it is to replace high-level leaders. Despite 
Henao’s capture, Rastrojos criminal operations in Colombia continue uninterrupted. The 
FARC’s organizational structure is also resilient and designed to function even after 
senior leaders are killed or infiltrated by Colombian security forces. As demonstrated by 
the November 4, 2011 killing of Alfonso Cano, the Commander in Chief and ideological 
leader of the FARC, the terrorist group continued to function by immediately naming 
Rodrigo Londoño, also known as Timochenko, as its new leader.132 Although the killing 
of Cano by the Colombian military represented a significant setback for the FARC, this 
terror group has not lost its capacity to operate because the organization has a pool of 
trained and trustworthy replacements ready to assume high-level positions whenever 
important leaders are killed or captured.133 
Consequently, the authors believe that targeting key organizations among the 
FARC Fronts, or lower-level organizations, has a higher probability of disrupting 
operations. Supporting evidence derives from the FARC leaders’ concern about mid-level 
corruption in the ranks due to the large amount of revenue generated by the drug trade. In 
2009, for example, the previous FARC leader Mono Jojoy, wrote that the economic crisis 
                                                 
130 Wradio News, “Demobilized Says Ivan Marquez and 'Timoshenko' Are in Venezuela,” December 
22, 2011, http://www.wradio.com.co/noticias/actualidad/desmovilizada-asegura-que-ivan-marquez-y-
timochenko-estan-en-venezuela/20111222/nota/1596031.aspx. 
131 El Tiempo, “Rastrojos Leader Was Hiding in Venezuela Farm,” June 3, 2012, 
http://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/ARTICULO-WEB-NEW_NOTA_INTERIOR-11919984.html. 
132 Alselma, “Colombian Army Kills FARC Leader Alfonso Cano.” 
133 Romero, “Colombian Rebels Still Dangerous Despite Leader’s Death.”  
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facing the FARC was a result of the lack of discipline, commitment, and financial 
corruption among the rebels.134 Soon after the death of “Mono Jojoy” on September 23, 
2010, at least three other high-ranking guerrillas within the FARC’s 44th Front, which 
operates in the Meta Department, deserted, and stole over $950,000, which reinforces the 
concerns of the now deceased leader.135 Demobilized reports from former members of 
the 44th Front further confirm Mono Jojoy’s fears that the FARC is having difficulty 
finding trustworthy mid-level organizational commanders who can run its highly 
profitable drug trafficking enterprise.  
Thus, the authors recommend that six lower-level organizations be targeted: 
Rastrojos-Lopez de Micay (Lopez de Micay), Rastrojos-Buenaventura (Buenaventura), 
ELN Special Troops (Guachavez), 30th Front-Mass Company (Lopez de Micay), 30th 
Front-2nd Company (Lopez de Micay), and the 30th Front-3rd Company (Lopez de 
Micay) (see Table 10).  
 
Organizations 
RASTROJOS, LOPEZ DE MICAY—LOPEZ DE MICAY 
RASTROJOS, BUENAVENTURA—BUENAVENTURA 
ELN SPECIAL TROOPS—GUACHAVEZ 
30th FRONT MASS COMPANY—LOPEZ DE MICAY 
30th FRONT 2nd COMPANY—LOPEZ DE MICAY 
30th FRONT 3rd COMPANY—LOPEZ DE MICAY 
Table 10.   The top six organizations for targeting identified in Chapter IV 
When security forces attack these organizations, they can either use kinetic, non-
kinetic, or a combination of the two of actions. A kinetic action is defined as an 
aggressive measure that uses force to either kill or capture members or supporters of a 
group.136 To measure the effectiveness of kinetic operations, the number of enemy 
                                                 
134 U.S. House, Committee on International Relations, International Global Terrorism: Its Links with 
Illicit Drugs Illustrated by the IRA and Other Groups in Colombia: Hearing Before the House Committee 
on International Relations, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., April 24, 2002, 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa78947.000/hfa78947_0f.htm. 
135 Manuela Kueher, “Rebel Leaders Steal Money from the FARC,” Colombia Reports, December 2, 
2011, http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/13230-suspicion-among-the-farc.html. 
136 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 31. 
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fighters killed or captured is typically counted. Non-kinetic action uses “non-coercive 
means to counter networks and impair [their] will to fight.”137 Non-kinetic courses of 
action rely on information operations to create deception, misinformation, disillusion, or 
mistrust within the network that to causes an implosion from within.  
D. KINETIC OPERATIONS AGAINST THE FARC 
During the last 10 years, Colombia has demonstrated an impressive adeptness at 
conducting kinetic operations. Colombia’s aggressive counterinsurgency strategy, which 
has relied primarily on kinetic operations, has killed or captured many of FARC’s top 
leaders and decimated many of its organizations. Unfortunately, terrorist groups like the 
FARC are resilient; they often survive the deaths of their key leaders despite lethal targeting.138 
In addition, kinetic targeting can backfire and produce more terrorists as it did when one 
killing inspired an additional 10 terrorists to join the network.139 Therefore, despite the 
gains made by Colombia’s aggressive kinetic strategy, the FARC continues to be a threat 
to Colombia’s security, especially its estimated drug rafficking income of $100 million to 
$1 billion a year.140  
E. NON-KINETIC OPERATIONS AGAINST THE FARC & ELN 
Colombia’s security forces have implemented an effective non-kinetic campaign 
to target members of insurgent organizations. Since 2002, Colombia’s demobilization 
program has successfully demobilized over 15,000 FARC, ELN, and other paramilitary 
fighters.141 Although non-kinetic operations are less expensive to implement, their 
intended effects often require time and patience before they can be realized. Despite the 
                                                 
137 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 31. 
138 Elespectador.com, “‘Alfonso Cano’ y 19 cabecillas de Farc han sido neutralizados en un año,” 
September 5, 2012, http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/articulo-372819-alfonso-cano-y-19-
cabecillas-de-farc-han-sido-neutralizados-un-a. 
139 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 31. 
140 U.S. State Department, “Background Note: Colombia.” 
141 Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración, “Desmovilization,” n.d., 
http://www.reintegración.gov.co/Es/proceso_ddr/Paginas/desmovilizacion.aspx. 
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large number of demobilized fighters during the last 10 years, the FARC and other 
criminal groups continue to be a threat to Colombia’s peace and stability. 
F. COMBINED OPERATIONS  
Colombia’s military battalions (Army and Marines) have proven adept at 
combining psychological and kinetic force when conducting offensive operations. 
Attacks against FARC and ELN guerillas usually include instructions on how to 
demobilize via radio and leaflets at the same time that kinetic force is being applied. The 
combined use of kinetic and non-kinetic operations by Colombia’s military has proven 
effective in the past and resulted in a high number of demobilized fighters.  
Combined operations between the police and the military also have proven 
successful at the strategic and operational levels as in the case of the successful targeting 
of Raul Reyes and Mono Jojoy. A possible extension of current policy would be to 
increase interaction between military and police units at the tactical level. Police have the 
responsibility for targeting criminal organizations, such as the Rastrojos, and the military 
has responsibility for killing and capturing the FARC terrorists. Since the semi-
submersible network involves both criminal and terrorist activities, it would a reasonable 
next step to increase the coordination between the two to facilitate intelligence sharing 
and targeting. More effective targeting in turn would likely reduce the threat to civilian 
populations who need to be protected and encouraged to supply information about 
criminal and terrorist activity.  
G. TARGETING OPTIONS 
The goal of this section is to identify three strategic options to target the semi-
submersible network. These options are then compared and contrasted based on the set of 
criteria outlined as follows. Application of these criteria to the three options makes it 
possible to identify one targeting strategy whose benefits outweigh is costs, and thus, has 
a greater probability of success based on the data analyzed. 
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1. Focused Strategy 
Drawing on the social network and geospatial analysis in Chapter IV, the focused 
strategy calls for police and military units to target the ELN, one of the most important 
low-level organizations in the semi-submersible network. The organization operates in 
the densest coca-growing region area of southwest Colombia. Destroying it would disable 
the network’s ability to produce cocaine and generate profits. 
2. Geospatial Strategy 
The second strategy, based on the analysis in Chapter IV, calls for Colombia’s 
military and police forces to conduct combined kinetic and non-kinetic operations against 
the Rastrojos Lopez de Micay, 30th Front Mass Company, 30th Front 2nd Company, and 
the 30th Front 3rd Company. These four organizations have close proximity to semi-
submersible seizures (Lopez de Micay)142 and are co-located so they would be easier to 
target at the same time. The collaboration between the Rastrojos Lopez de Micay network 
and the FARC’s 30th Front also can be exploited with a misinformation campaign 
designed to create mistrust between these low-level organizations. Selected targeting to 
give the appearance that Rastrojos members are killing members of the FARC’s 30th 
Front also has the potential to rupture the business ties between these two groups that 
could help to undermine semi-submersible operations.  
3. Combined Strategy 
The third strategy combines military and police forces to hit all six of 
recommended targets at the same time with a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic 
operations. Guachavez (ELN), Buenaventura (Rastrojos), and Lopez de Micay 
(Rastrojos, FARC’s 30th Front Companies) could be attacked with a misinformation 
campaign to create mistrust between criminal groups and guerilla organizations like the 
FARC and the ELN while at the same time the police and military units could apply 
kinetic force. Although these attacks would require extensive coordination between the 
                                                 
142 Lopez de Micay is the closest urban area to the Sanquianga National Park, and such, support 
elements would come from this town via boat. Sanquianga National Park is a very isolated area along the 
pacific coast. The only avenues of approach are via air or water.  
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military since the FARC and ELN represent military targets, and the Rastrojos represents 
police targets, this operation, if successfully executed, has the potential to effect semi-
submersible operations severely.  
H. CRITERIA 
To identify a preferred strategy, a decision matrix was developed based on five 
criteria: intelligence requirements, personnel requirements, coordination requirements, 
resource requirements, and level of risk. Intelligence requirements refer to the 
information needed to know about the enemy. From a scale of 1-5, a high score of 5 
would mean that extensive intelligence is required to be successful whereas a score of 1 
would mean that less intelligence would be required. A combined strategy receives a high 
score of 5 since more intelligence would be required to target six organizations at the 
same time in three different locations (see Table 10). A focused strategy would require 
less intelligence to be successful since only the ELN is targeted in one geographic 
location. It therefore receives a score of 3.  
The second criterion is personnel requirements, defined as the number of police, 
military or Special Forces soldiers needed to attack a target successfully. The higher the 
score between 1 to 5, the more personnel needed for accomplishing the mission. Since a 
focused strategy is only attacking one target (the ELN) in one geographic location, this 
option scores the lowest in personnel requirements with a rating of 3. The combined 
strategy scores the highest (5) because it would require the most forces.  
Coordination, the third criterion, refers to the level of interaction needed between 
the police and the military to accomplish the mission. For example, the focused strategy 
that targets the ELN has minimal coordination requirements because it is primarily a 
military target, although intelligence sharing with the police would be useful since the 
ELN is collaborating and coordinating with other criminal organizations that profit from 
the drug trade. Since less coordination is required between police and military to 
effectively execute this option, a lower score of 1 was assigned. On the other hand, the 
combined strategy would be awarded a score of 5 given its high coordination 
requirements between the police and the military.  
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Resource requirements are the fourth criterion. It is defined as the level of 
funding, weapons, training, and equipment needed to accomplish the mission. A higher 
number (from 1 to 5) means that more resources are required for mission 
accomplishment. Thus, the focused strategy, requiring the least amount of resources, 
receives the lowest score (1) and the combined strategy receives the highest (5).  
Risk is the fifth criterion. It is defined as the potential for failure given the 
complexity of the strategy. the combined strategy is considered the riskiest because with 
so many people, with so many resource requirements, with so many geospatially 
dispersed targets to hit at the same time, the potential for something going wrong is much 
more likely than just attacking one organization (focused strategy). Since the combined 
strategy is considered the riskiest, it had the highest score (5) and was followed by the 
geospatial (4) and the focused strategies (3). 
I. COMPARISON OF STRATEGIC OPTIONS—DECISION MATRIX 
Table 11 is the decision matrix that identifies the recommended strategy based on 
the sum of its scores across all criteria. The highest score identifies the option that 
requires the most number of troops, the greater number of resources, the highest level of 




(5= high. 1 = low) 
Focused Strategy Geospatial Strategy Multi-Task Strategy 
Intelligence 3 4 5 
Personnel 3 4 5 
Coordination 3 4 5 
Resources 3 4 5 
Risk 3 4 5 
Final sum 15 20 25 
Table 11.   Decision matrix to identify the best strategic option 
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J. RECOMMENDED OPTION 
Based on the above criteria and a score of 15, the focused strategy has the least 
risk and requires fewer resources to execute. If successful, a combination of kinetic and 
non-kinetic actions against ELN Special Troops would be expected to have a large 
impact on the semi-submersible network’s capacity to produce cocaine. In contrast, the 
combined strategy would be the most difficult to execute because it targets all six 
organizations in three geographic locations at the same time using both police and 
military forces. If Colombia were to pursue this strategy, it would have the potential to 
yield the best results, but tackling an operation of this magnitude would require full 
mobilization of troops and could potentially impact local populations where operations 
are being conducted. Choice of a preferred strategy ultimately boils down to the level of 
risk the government wants to assume and the resource it wants to allocate to the effort.  
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The FARC has been in existence since 1964, evolving from a peasant uprising of 
a few hundred individuals to a large, business-like structure of more than 20,000 
individuals. One of its latest technologies has been the development of semi-submersibles 
to carry drugs from South American to Central and North America. Recent data on semi-
submersible seizures suggest that most of the underwater vehicles are being built in the 
Southwest Pacific region although activities are expanding into Ecuador and Panama as 
Colombia’s security forces intensify pressure against the FARC and criminal 
organizations involved in the semi-submersible network.  
The purpose of this study has been to identify strategic options to disrupt the 
semi-submersible network in the Pacific region of Colombia. This area is a central 
location for the design and construction of semi-submersibles and checking their growth 
and development would undercut the FARC’s ability to transport and sell cocaine, which 
would ultimately affect its capacity to finance its insurgency. In addition, effectively 
attacking the network would deny non-state actors (NSAs) access to semi-submersible 
technology and use of these underwater vehicles to carry weapons of mass destruction to 
the U.S. homeland. 
B. SUMMARY OF METHODOLOGY AND ITS LIMITATIONS 
This research relies on open source data much of which had to be translated from 
Spanish into English to analyze the relationships in the semi-submersible network. 
Classified data were not included, and consequently, central nodes and important links 
within the network may not be properly identified or may be missing, which can 
dramatically affect the results. Given these restrictions, these results should be viewed as 
tentative rather than definitive. Instead of recommendations for action, future studies are 
requested that combine both classified and open-source data to provide a fuller 
articulation of the semi-submersible network.  
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The geospatial, temporal, link and social network analyses were powerful tools 
that made it possible to illuminate the semi-submersible network and locate the areas of 
semi-submersible operations. As evidenced in Chapter IV, with these methods, it was 
possible to identify six of the network’s most important lower-level organizations and 
two of its most central organizations—the FARC’s Joint Western Command and the 
Rastrojos criminal organization. The increased knowledge gained from conducting this 
analysis was instrumental in developing options to attack the semi-submersible network.  
C. STRATEGIC OPTIONS 
Of the 149 organizations in the semi-submersible network, six surfaced as the 
most important lower-level organizations. They are listed in Table 12. 
 
Organizations 
RASTROJOS, LOPEZ DE MICAY—LOPEZ DE MICAY 
RASTROJOS, BUENAVENTURA—BUENAVENTURA 
ELN SPECIAL TROOPS—GUACHAVEZ 
30th FRONT MASS COMPANY—LOPEZ DE MICAY 
30th FRONT 2nd COMPANY—LOPEZ DE MICAY 
30th FRONT 3nd COMPANY—LOPEZ DE MICAY 
Table 12.   The most important lower-level organizations  
From this targeted list, three strategic options were developed for disruption: a 
focused strategy, a geospatial strategy, and a combined strategy as described in Chapter 
V. A decision matrix was then created to compare and contrast the options based on a set 
of criteria. This analysis pointed to the focused strategy that targeted the ELN Special 
Troops in Guachavez at the tactical level as having the least costs and the least risk. In 
contrast, the combined strategy had the most costs and highest risk since it calls for 
attacking all six organizations with combined police and military intelligence and 
operation efforts at the tactical level. All three strategies have merit, but ultimately, they 
depend on what levels of risk command authority is willing to accept and level of 
resources they are able to commit.  
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH 
The authors have recommended the integration of classified and open-source data 
as an important next step in building out the semi-submersible data set. Classified data 
from organizations, such as the Colombian Ministry of Defense,143 the Joint Interagency 
Task Force-South, as well as Special Operations Command South, located in Key West 
and Miami, respectively, are likely sources. Beyond calling for a more comprehensive 
study of the semi-submersible network, and offering these tentative recommendations for 
targeting the FARC’s operations, the authors strongly recommend others consider 
adopting the research process they have followed. It is their hope that the process used to 
collect, code, structure, and analyze data and develop strategic options for action, will 
serve as a guide for others who want to counter terror and criminal networks that threaten 
their stability and peace.  
                                                 
143 Similar to the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), this agency is responsible for both the military 
and police forces in Colombia.  
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